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Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have usually
focused on domestic variables to explain US/Soviet arms
control behavior.
ting parties

i~

Partly because the number of negotia-

only two, there is a propensity to focus

on the bilateral relationship of the United States and
the Soviet Union and their respective domestic political
situations.

Only superficial attention has usually been

2

given to international systems variables that may well
influence the domestic political situation and arms control policy.
This thesis broadens the explanatory scope of
US/Soviet arms control by showing how the political environment of a trilateral relationship (a subsystem that
includes the West European members of NATO as a single
actor as well as the United States and the Soviet Union)
is a primary motivator of US/Soviet arms control behavior.
Three main reasons are given as to why this particular subsystem is an important determinant in US/Soviet
arms control.

First, arms control is a security issue.

It involves both defense and deterrence.
Secondly, each actor in the subsystem plays an important security role, either as adversary or alliance
partner, or both.

Certain assumptions of behavior are

accordingly ascribed to each actor.

Alliance unity and

alliance reassurance then become part of the overall
security equation.
Third, Western Europe has played an increasingly
influential role in US/Soviet arms control due to its
geo-strategic position between the two superpowers, its
growing economic position in the international arena, and
the attainment of nuclear parity between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
two additional factorsa

Greater attention is now given to
West European security concerns

of "entrapment" in a nuclear war as a result of superpower

J

conflicta and, U.S. •abandonment• of its military commitment to protect Western Europe as a result of superpower
cooperation.
The chapters of this thesis present an inquiry into
certain domestic determinants of US/Soviet arms control
behavior in three arms control regimes (SALT I, SALT II,
and INF/START), followed by observations that support and
emphasize the explanatory influence of the subsystem perspective.
Utilizing •events-data• analysis and the New York
Times Index, quantitative data is presented as additional
support for the subsystem perspective.
For each arms control regime analyzed, it is concluded that US/Soviet arms control is influenced by the
interaction of the adversary/alliance subsystem relationships.

The resultant political environment of this

subsystem affects US/Soviet arms control, and influences
the domestic determinants of arms control as well.

In

part, SALT I negotiations were motivated by Western
security perceptions, particularly among West Europeans,
that sought an end to the Cold War relations by promoting
East/West cooperation.

The results were the treaties of

SALT I and the codification of detente.

By the latter

1970s, however, NATO perceptions of security had changed,
focusing on the need for new weapons deployments in lieu
of arms control.

SALT II was doomed, in part by criticism
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at home and in Western Europe, that it failed to address
the perceived imbalance in theater nuclear forces.
The INF/START negotiations in the early 1980s
reflected another change in NATO security perceptions.
This time cruise and Pershing II missiles would be deployed in Western Europe but would be coupled with arms
control negotiations.

The •dual track" decision was not

so much a bargaining chip tactic to achieve reductions in
Soviet missiles as it was a demonstration of NATO ambivalence over Western security policy.

The •dual track•

decision was designed both to reduce West European

concer~s

of entrapment, via arms control, and to reduce West European fears of abandonment via arms deployments.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW OF GOALS
The basic purpose of this study's examination of
US/Soviet arms control is to broaden the analytic scope of
this issue.1

Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have

usually focused either on the domestic political situation
of the United States or the Soviet Union, or have emphasized
comparisons of their domestic policies in explaining arms
control behavior.

The wide range of literature on this

issue has generally given only perfunctory attention to
international system variables that may well influence the
domestic political situation and arms control policy. 2
The perfunctory attention given to international
system variables in analyses of US/Soviet arms control is
partly because of an assumption based in the bilateral
nature of formal negotiations.

Since the number of

negotiating parties is limited to two, there is a propensity
to focus solely on the foreign policymaking of those two
parties.

Such approaches are highly applicable, yet they

are not without limitations.3

The actions of one state that

affect its relations with another state are not made in

2

total isolation from the rest of the international system.
Therefore, it is quite possible to enhance our understanding
of certain foreign policy behavior by including relevant
international system variables. 4

In order to demonstrate

the importance of including relevant international system
variables in US/Soviet arms control analyses, three arms
control regimes have been chosen for examination.
SALT I

They are

(Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), SALT II, and

INF/START (Intermediate Nuclear Forces and Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks).
THE SUBSYSTEM MODEL
Citing international system variables that may
influence US/Soviet arms control is not a difficult task
given the highly interactive nature of world politics.
However, because arms control is a security

issue,~

it is

essential that the criteria in choosing relevant
international system variables for examination are those
which have the most direct influence on U.S. and Soviet
security, and those that are most directly affected by
US/Soviet arms control.

The variables chosen for this study

are the US/Soviet relationship, the US/West European
relationship, and the West European/Soviet relationship. 6
These three dyads form a trilateral subsystem 7 in
which Western Europe, 8 though not a direct party to the
US/Soviet arms control treaties or negotiations chosen for

3

examination, does have a significant influence on arms
control behavior by virtue of its position as alliance
partner with the United States, its gee-strategic position
between the United States and the Soviet Union, its growing
economic influence in the world, and the attainment of
nuclear parity between the two superpowers (see Figure 1).
Following World War II the security of Europe was
linked to the security of the United States by extending the
U.S. nuclear deterrent to its West European allies.

At that

time U.S. hegemony over the alliance was an accepted fact as
was the credibility of the United States to deter Soviet
aggression against Western Europe.

"Massive Retaliation"

was a credible policy of deterrence as long as the United
States could strike the Soviet Union without risking a
reciprocal strike.

The "decoupling" effect 9 of nuclear

parity was not a foreseeable problem in the earlier years of
the alliance, but fostered by the post-war economic recovery
of Western Europe and intensified by the attainment of
strategic parity between the superpowers, the security
concerns unique to West Europeans have been expressed with
an increasingly more independent and confident voice.
Accordingly, these concerns are translated into
political leverage over the arms control positions of the
two superpowers.

With both the United States and the Soviet

Union seeking to accommodate the West Europeans, the junior
alliance partner thus acquires indirect, though highly

NOINil
.!aIAOS

>
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influential bargaining power in arms negotiations.

It is

the changes in West European security concerns and the
effects of those changes on the subsystem relationships that
are important in explaining the success or failure of
US/Soviet arms control.
ASSUMPTIONS OF BEHAVIOR
The role of each actor within the subsystem allows
certain assumptions to be made regarding their behavior
toward one another.
The US/Soviet relationship, characterized as
adversarial, is such that each perceives the other as the
main threat to its own security.

As security enhancing

measures each attempts to undermine the security of the
other and maintain a credible deterrence against the
encroachment of its own security.

The unity of NATO (North

Atlantic Treaty Organization) is perceived by the United
States as essential to its deterrence of the Soviet Union. 10
The Soviet Union perceives alliance unity as a threat to its
own security.

Therefore, Soviet arms control policy will

attempt to divide the alliance whereas U.S. arms control
policy will attempt to unify it.
The US/West European relationship is characterized by
partnership in military alliance (NATO).

The alliance is

characterized by common security but it is also
characterized by distinct security concerns.

It is these

6

individual concerns about security that can cause tensions
between the alliance partners.
Similar to the "abandonment-entrapment dilemma"
discussed by Robert Osgood, alliance tensions can be caused
by adversary cooperation or by adversary conflict. 11

West

European concerns may be heightened if U.S. bilateral
agreements with the Soviet Union are perceived as evidence
of American abandonment of Western Europe.

On the other

hand, concerns may rise if US/Soviet conflict (i.e., nuclear
arms race) is perceived as leading to entrapment in a
superpower inflicted war.

Thus, Western Europe may

encourage a US/Soviet rapprochement in order to reduce the
risks of entrapment, but may then criticize the United
States and/or the Soviet Union if the trend of adversary
cooperation begins to show signs of abandonment.
As Jane Sharp has suggested, this relationship should
be viewed as circular rather than linear, as a cycle which
may begin by Western Europe seeking reassurance from the
United States due to anxiety causing events. 1 2

The United

States then responds with reassurance in the form of
consultations, new weapons for NATO defense, or a tougher
policy toward arms control.

The West Europeans then

encourage a renewed superpower attempt at cooperation,
which, if further bilateral agreements are generated, may
induce new fears of abandonment.1 3
The West European/Soviet relationship includes the

7

abandonment-entrapment concerns of Western Europe and the
adversarial characteristic of that relationship.

The Soviet

Union, through policies of cooperation or conflict toward
Western Europe, may attempt to divide the alliance.

Western

Europe may promote cooperation or conflict between the
United States and the Soviet Union depending upon its own
security concerns.

Western Europe may also choose policies

of cooperation or conflict with the Soviet Union depending
upon its perceptions of U.S. abandonment and/or superpower
entrapment.
The arms control policies of the United States and the
Soviet Union are, therefore, affected by the trilateral
relationships of the subsystem.

By examining these

relationships and US/Soviet arms control over specific time
periods, it should be possible to suggest in which instances
the subsystem variables had more influence on arms
negotiations than the domestic perspective.
There are questions that might be raised to compare
the domestic and subsystem approaches.

For example, should

the motivation by the United States and the Soviet Union to
pursue SALT I be regarded more as policy goals
characteristic of the Nixon administration and the Brezhnev
regime, or should the stimulus to negotiate be viewed more
as a result of systemic pressures on the United States and
the Soviet Union?

Were the failure of the U.S. Senate to

ratify the SALT II Treaty and the NATO decision to deploy

8

cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe primarily
due to political features of the Carter administration
and/or Soviet policies, or were they consequences of a
larger political environment in which Western Europe had
become more openly disconcerted over a US/Soviet condominium
that sacrificed West European security?

Was the collapse of

the INF/START talks in 1983 due to Andropov's waning
political power, Soviet domestic problems, and the antiSoviet ideology of the Reagan administration, or in the
systemic view, was the Soviet walkout part of a consistency
in Soviet policy--the use of arms control to drive a
political wedge between the United States and Western
Europe?
There are, of course, no black and white answers.
This is true in part because the explanations are colored by
the characteristics of both perspectives.

This study is not

predisposed toward any single-dimension approach to the
study of arms control, but it is critical of comparative
research that excludes international system variables as
explanatory possibilities.
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DATA
The time frame covered in this study is from 1969
through 1983.

This period coincides with events surrounding

three arms control regimes--SALT I, SALT II, and INF/START.
Each of the three subsystem relationships is observed over

9

each period of arms control so that conclusions can be made
regarding the association between these variables and arms
control behavior.
Measurement of each variable is accomplished by the
use of "events-data" analysis. 14

The relevance of this

method is that it utilizes behavior as the unit of
observation.

Events are transformed into data according to

the type of behavior they

represent.

1

~

Each variable is

characterized by its behavior classification, derived from a
set of events observed over a specific time period.

Because

the chronology of events is retained in the analysis of the
data, and because the data are classified by type and
frequency, this methodology also allows for the use of some
quantitative analytic procedures.
Data has been collected for each subsystem
relationship, then coded according to its behavior type.
For both the US/Soviet and the West European/Soviet
relationships, behavior is classified into a
conflict/cooperation typology.

Events are coded according

to the degree of cooperation or conflict they reflect.

The

US/West European relationship is coded somewhat differently.
A unity/disunity typology is used and events are coded by
the degree to which they reflect unity or disunity in the
alliance relationship.
Following the collection and coding of data for each
variable, simple quantitative analytic techniques have been

10
employed.

These techniques organize the data into frequency

and percentage tables for general and more specific time
periods of arms control (see Appendix).

These tables show

both the frequencies of behavior across time and the
distribution of behavior classifications across time for
each subsystem variable.

The percent positive for each

relationship has been graphically illustrated (see Figure
2).

Conclusions can then be based on the observed

association between arms control behavior and the subsystem
variables, both in the aggregate and for more specific time
periods.
In addition to the subsystem approach, an internal
variable has been observed for the same time period.
Labeled the Political Leader Characteristics Variable, it
measures certain aspects of the domestic political situation
of both the United States and the Soviet Union which have
been deemed relevant in influencing arms control.

This

variable capsulizes Margaret Hermann's model, the
''Leadership Characteristics Variable," into three
categories:

"Personal Attitudes"; "Scope of Authority''; and

"Participation." 16

These categories represent

characteristics of the political leader, not just those he
personally provides (e.g., ideology) but also those created
by his political position as head of a particular political
system.
''Personal Attitudes" refers to the leader's unique
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Figure 2. Graph showing percent positive in subsystem relationships.

12
political style, his personal beliefs, and personal views of
the world.
"Scope of Authority" refers to the political leader's
latitude in decisionmaking.
Congress?

Of the public?

Does he have the support of
How constrained is he in his

immediate decisionmaking role?

In the case of the American

leader, this is measured by the margin by which he was
elected, by public approval in reliable surveys, and by the
percent of his party's constituency represented in Congress.
In the case of the Soviet leader, scope of authority is
measured by the degree to which he dominates decisionmaking
in the Politburo, and the relative ease with which his
policy goals are implemented and carried out.
"Participation" refers to the amount of attention the
leader gives personally to foreign policy, particularly arms
control.

This not only involves his personal interest in

arms control but also the degree to which he delegates his
authority to his subordinates or relies on others in his
decisionrnaking.
Although this variable does not encompass other
domestic political factors,

it does cover the most relevant

and accessible in regards to arms control policymaking.
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CHAPTER I NOTES
tFor analytical purposes of this study arms control is
defined as:
arrangements between the United States and the
Soviet Union to limit and/or reduce their nuclear force
structures. Both states' behavior towards arms control
include:
the motivation of either side to pursue arms
control agreements; their negotiating positions; proposals
and rejections of proposals, and; reasons for agreements or
failure to reach agreements.
2A few recent examples include, Thomas W. Wolfe, The
SALT Experience (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., Inc.,
1979); Frank Whelen Wayman, "Arms Control and Strategic Arms
Voting in the U.S. Senate," Journal of Conflict Resolution
(Vol. 29, No. 2, June 1985); Myron Hedlin, "Moscow's Line on
Arms Control," Problems of Communism (May/June 1984); and
Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1984) .
3For an excellent discussion of the advantages and
limitations of various comparative foreign policy approaches
see, Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F.
Hermann, eds., Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1978).
4 For

an excellent analysis of international system
variable influence on foreign policy see, Gary L. Scott and
Takashi Shinobu, "Reassessing the Japan-China Peace and
Friendship Treaty Negotiations: A Comparative Foreign Policy
Perspective," gournal of Northeast Asian Studies (Vol II,
No. 4, December 1983).
~The term security is a highly ambiguous and thus
controversial concept.
For purposes of this study, security
refers to the military defense of a state or the ability tc
deter an adversary.
The necessary security requirement of ~
state and the perceptions of threats to that security are
determined by the political leaders of that state.

0ther international system variables that may
influence US/Soviet arms control such as Japan, China, and
the Warsaw Pact do not fit the criteria as neatly as Western
Europe. Japan, although a major economic power and included
under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is not a military alliance
partner with either the United States or the Soviet Union.
The Warsaw Pact, an alliance of East Bloc countries, may
influence US/Soviet arms control.
However, independence in
foreign policymaking is far more subordinate to Soviet
policy than West European policymaking is to United States
6
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policy. Additionally, information regarding policy process
is highly inaccessible.
However, other analyses of US/Soviet arms control
which include these or other international system variables
are encouraged since they further a broader understanding of
US/Soviet arms control and the development of multicausal
theory.
7 A subsystems approach adheres to the same theoretical
views of a systems approach, although it delineates a
particular subset of the international system for
examination.
For further discussion and references of the
systemic perspective in international relations theory see,
for example, Maurice A. East, "The International System
Perspective and Foreign Policy," in East, et al., Why
Nations Act, pp. 143-160; "Systemic Theories of Politics and
International Relations," in James E. Dougherty and Robert
L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International
Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), and; Richard
Little, "A Systems Approach," in Trevor Taylor, ed.,
Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London:
Longman Group Limited, 1978), pp. 182-204.
8 Another aspect of the subsystem model must be
clarified. This is the theoretical treatment of Western
Europe as a single political actor. While this may present
real problems in practice, it is most appropriate to the
approach of this study. The level of analysis from which
arms control is examined utilizes Western Europe as a single
unit, as an alliance partner, and thereby posits a distinct
set of theoretical questions.
9 The verb ''decouple" is a term applied in alliance and
deterrence theory.
In the context of NATO and the extended
deterrent of the United States to Western Europe, the
decoupling effect refers to the splitting up of alliance
partners due to the lack of credibility of extended
deterrence in a political environment characterized by
strategic parity between the superpowers.

°For a thoughtful discussion on this point see, for
example, Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence:
Western Defense in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 61,
1983)
PP• 309-324.
1

1
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See, Robert E. Osgood, The Entangling Alliance
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). For further
discussion see, for example, Glen H. Snyder, "The Security
dilemma in alliance Politics," World Politics (No. 36, July
1984).

15
See, Jane M.O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance
Commitments," Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 100, No. 4,
Winter 1985-1986).
12

t3Ibid., pp. 651-652.
14 For

a discussion of the techniques of events-data
analysis see, for example, Charles A. McClelland, et al.,
The Communist Chinese Performance in Crisis and Noncrisis:
Quantitative Studies of the Taiwan Straits Confrontation,
1950-1964 (U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake,
Ca., 1967); and Charles A. McClelland and Gary Hoggard,
"Conflict Patterns in the Interaction Among Nations," in
James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign
Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969). This study follows
McClelland's method, although a variation in the coding of
events has been adapted to meet the peculiarities of this
study.
This analysis utilizes the New York Times Index as
its source.
I must note that by relying on a single source
for my data I risk some degree of validity. This I have
opted to do in the interest of time and simplicity.
1

~The definition of an "event" is borrowed from the
CREON Project (Comparative Research on the Events of
Nations).
Unpublished Manuscript, p. 34.
" ... a
minimally aggregated action resulting from a decision by the
political authorities of a state, who have the power to
commit the resources of the national government." An event
consists of an actor, an action, and the direct object or
indirect object of that action.
16 The

characteristics of this variable are taken
mainly from the leader personality perspective discussed by
Margaret Hermann in "Effects of Personal Characteristics of
Political Leaders on Foreign Policy," in East, et al., Why
Nations Act, pp. 49-68.

CHAPTER II
SALT I
THE ISSUES OF SALT I
The issues and events associated with the negotiation
of SALT I begin with the opening meeting between the U.S.
and Soviet delegations in Helsinki in November 1969 and end
with the signing of the SALT agreements in Moscow on 26 May
1972.

This period covers the seven rounds of talks between

the two delegations, alternating between Helsinki and
Vienna; the so-called "back channel" negotiations between
higher officials of both governments; and the climactic
summit meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary
Brezhnev, during which the final details of the agreements
were worked out.

The following is a summary of the key

issues of SALT I. 1
Aside from the agreements signed in 1971, to reduce
the accidental occurrence of nuclear war and to upgrade the
communications link between the two countries, SALT I
produced two separate agreements on the limitation of
strategic weapons systems.

These were the ABM Treaty, a

limitation on Antiballistic Missile systems, and the Interim

17
Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons.

The latter

agreement, however, was limited to missile launchers.
Although these agreements marked a real achievement in
the progress toward mutual arms reduction, they demonstrated
only moderate results from what began as much broader
objectives; from the total banning of ABMs to a
comprehensive limitation and reduction of both offensive and
defensive systems, including Forward-Based Systems (FBS),
and Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).
The first round of talks in Helsinki was considered an
exploratory meeting, open to discussion on any related
issue.

The Soviets immediately took the opportunity to

raise the question of American FBS, those weapons systems
deployed in forward bases around Western Europe. 2
This issue opened the way for debate over the definition of
tactical versus strategic weapons, a debate that became a
major obstacle to any comprehensive treaty limiting
offensive weapons.

The Soviets opposed any freeze on their

European targeted Intermediate and Medium-range Ballistic
Missiles (IR/MRBMs), labeling them tactical (incapable of
striking the U.S. mainland), but insisted on including in a
treaty the "strategic" Forward-Based Systems of the United
States (capable of striking the Soviet Union) .

On the other

hand, the United States defined its FBS not by whom or what
they were targeted at, but by their range capability.

Thus,

18

only American systems capable of intercontinental range were
deemed strategic.
It was not until late in the second round of talks in
Vienna (August 1970) that the first real proposals toward a
treaty were offered by either side.
became known as the "Vienna Option.''

The U.S. proposal
This proposal,

actually a modification of three slightly different
approaches, limited launchers of both sides, put a
subceiling on Soviet SS-9 launchers, and established a
freeze at current levels on strategic bombers, IR/MRBMs, and
Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs).

References to

MIRVs included either total banning of flight testing and
deployment, or no limitation coupled with incremental
reductions in launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMs).

ABMs would either be limited to one site for each

country to defend its National Command Authority (NCA), or
they would be completely banned.

Any treaty would be

comprehensive, considering offensive and defensive systems
together.

A Soviet proposal called for joint retaliation

against any country launching a provocative attack against
either party.

Neither proposal was well received.

The third round of talks in Helsinki was relatively
passive in that the United States held to the Vienna Option,
insisting that the Soviets respond to it.

The Soviets

continued their arguments to include FBS.

In December 1970
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the Soviets tabled their FBS "Compensation Proposal'' which
was, according to them, an attempt to compromise on the FBS
issue. 3

This meant a partial rather than complete

withdrawal of U.S. Forward-Based Systems, but to be
accompanied by a reduction in U.S. strategic launchers--the
launcher reduction being compensation for any remaining FBS.
Rejecting this proposal, the United States then offered the
so-called ''Helsinki Formula" by which the United States
would consider the FBS issue only after all the main
elements of an initial agreement on central strategic
systems had been worked out. 4

The Soviets, however, were

not interested.
Near the end of this round a private proposal was made
by the head of the Soviet delegation for a mutual no first
use of nuclear weapons.
United States.

This, too, was unacceptable for the

Also in December the Soviets directed the

negotiations away from a comprehensive agreement by
proposing their "Basic Provisions for an Agreement on
Limiting Deployment of ABM Systems."

This called for a

singling out of the ABM issue and negotiating a separate
agreement.

The "Provisions" included one ABM site to defend

launchers, missiles and radars; a limitation on the radius
of defense around each capital, and; equal numbers of
launchers and missiles.

Retreating somewhat from its

position in favor of a comprehensive offensive/defensive
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treaty, the United States did not reject the proposal
outright but left it open for further discussion.
The fourth round of talks began in March 1971.

While

the delegations made little progress in Vienna, the focus of
the negotiations had transferred to "backchannel" meetings.
Talks between National Security Advisor Kissinger and Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin led to an exchange of letters between
President Nixon and Soviet Premier Kosygin.
known as the May 1971 Accord.
point in the U.S. position.

This became

It also marked a turning
By ''agreeing to agree" to focus

on ABM limitations the United States was abandoning its
comprehensive treaty position in favor of negotiating a
defensive treaty separate from an offensive one.

Both sides

also narrowed their objective for a moratorium or freeze
approach to offensive weapons.

But the United States had

not excluded offensive freeze limitations altogether.
Rather, it insisted on a freeze in conjunction with an ABM
agreement.

The Soviets, however, refused to negotiate a

freeze until an ABM treaty was reached.

Both the fourth

round of talks and the following round in Helsinki
subsequently focused on negotiating an ABM treaty.
Progress was made on ABM issues, while offensive
freeze negotiations remained stalled.

The fifth round, from

July to September 1971, produced the first real results of
SALT--the Joint Draft Text of an ABM Agreement.

Then on

October 12 President Nixon announced his decision to go to
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Moscow the following spring.

This set a deadline of sorts

and quickened the pace for progress in negotiations, which
resumed for a sixth round in November.
In Vienna talks continued on unagreed items of the ABM
treaty while discussions on an offensive freeze were
revived.

Still opposing the inclusion of SLBMs, the Soviets

tabled a freeze proposal halting new ICBM development and
deployment beginning 1 July 1972, or at such time the treaty
would take effect.

A freeze on new ICBM launchers following

the signing of the treaty was acceptable to the United
States, but only on conditions which allowed some
modernization and replacement of outdated systems.
By March 1972, as the seventh round of talks proceeded
in Helsinki, an agreement on ABMs was nearing its final
stages.

Talks on an interim freeze on offensive weapons

were also progressing.

The remaining issues of the ABM

treaty were narrowed to numbers, how many sites and where,
how many launchers and interceptor missiles, and how many
radar components.

Negotiations on the interim freeze

continued over the SLBM debate, a ceiling on "heavy"
launchers, and the duration that the treaty would remain in
force.
Toward mid-April Kissinger began meeting secretly with
Brezhnev to discuss SALT and arrangements for Nixon's
impending visit scheduled for May.

Kissinger returned from

Moscow with a Soviet proposal on the SLBM and ABM issues in
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which Brezhnev indicated a willingness to include SLBMs at
specified levels.

The pace of compromise increased steadily

as the summit date approached.

By the time the President's

negotiating team arrived in Moscow the only ABM item left to
agree to was the distance between the permitted ABM sites--a
concern over radar overlap.

A freeze on new ICBM launchers

had already been agreed upon in Helsinki, and the levels of
submarines and launchers resolved by Kissinger and Brezhnev.
All of the unfinished negotiating points were worked
out in Moscow prior to the final signing of the treaties.
One of the few remaining issues involved modernization and
replacement, made somewhat difficult due to the problems of
verification.

Agreement was reached, however, on both

issues; modernization and replacement being limited only by
the provisions of the treaties themselves, and treaty
compliance to be carried out by national means.
While the above summary of SALT I does not capture the
complexity of the negotiations (i.e., technical details of
the weaponry, or negotiating tactics) it does, however,
highlight the key issues involved.

Attempting to provide

explanatory meaning to these issues is yet another matter.
What were the motives behind those positions and proposals
taken by both sides?
Why, for instance, was SALT able to begin in 1969 but
not in 1968?

Why were the negotiations policy goals of the

United States and the Soviet Union?

Why were the

23

negotiations able to overcome serious obstacles?
the treaties signed in 1972?

Why were

Why was the Soviet Union so

adamant about including U.S. Forward-Based Systems?

Why did

the U.S. abandon its position for a comprehensive treaty?
Many of these questions can surely be answered with
reasonable reliability as products of certain political
factors at work within the two countries.

Others, however,

can only be answered, or given more meaning, from the
subsystem perspective.
THE POLITICAL LEADER CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE
The Nixon Administration:

Personal Attitudes

The unique personal qualities which Richard Nixon
brought to the White House, together with the extraordinary
circumstances in which he left, has presented itself as an
intriguing case study to many observers; political
scientists, historians, and psychoanalysts alike.
What emerges from the literature is a general
consensus of Nixon; that he was pragmatic, conservative,
insecure, paranoid, secretive, and self-aggrandizing.
Barber classifies Nixon as an "active-negative''

president.~

According to this analysis, Nixon's aggressiveness, his
compulsive striving for power and status, and his
inflexibility were contrasted by a destructive tendency, a
weak ego, insecurity, and low self-esteem.

The coexistence
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of these qualities eventually led to his downfall.

He was

his own worst enemy.
Mazlish, in his psychohistorical analysis of Nixon,
emphasizes three overriding personality traits:

his "almost

unique absorption of self" in his role as President; his
"ambivalence"; and, his "denial" in accepting his own
aggressive nature. 6

Nixon saw himself as a man of

"greatness," but was paranoid in his fear of criticism,
passivity, and dependence on others. 7
According to Kissinger, who was closest to Nixon
during his presidency, Nixon "feared rebuffs," was paranoid,
and distrusted almost everyone, including members of his own
cabinet. 8

Aside from a few observers who view Nixon's

policies as reflecting his true liberal character, his
prepresidential "hawkish" views as nothing more than voteseeking rhetoric, 9 the more general feeling is one of a
conservative Nixon whose anti-communist ideology and
campaign rhetoric were dominated by his pragmatism in
foreign policy once he took office.
Nixon came to off ice a strong backer of
"superiority." As a candidate he had charged the
Johnson administration with permitting a "security
gap." He had called "parity" a "peculiar,
unprecedented doctrine," and he said that "it
appears that the closer we approach strategic
parity, the further we move from a stable peace."
He hoped, he had said, to be able to negotiate with
the Russians, "from a superior standpoint." 10
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Participation
After taking office in January 1969, Nixon indicated
that his administration would base its Soviet policy not on
confrontation but "negotiation," not on military superiority
but military "sufficiency." 11

This policy goal not only

reflected his pragmatism (which was influenced by
Kissinger's "Realpolitik'') but also demonstrated an
intention that he, as President, would play the principal
role in foreign policy decisionmaking.
Nixon's high level of participation in foreign policy
decisionmaking was based partly on his personal desire for
status and his distrust of others.

But it was also based on

a genuine interest and experience in foreign affairs.

As

Vice President under Eisenhower, Nixon traveled extensively,
meeting with a number of foreign leaders.

He also displayed

a great intuitive ability for international politics.
Kissinger "was struck by his perceptiveness and knowledge"
on foreign policy.12
Scope of Authority
Nixon lacked a wide scope of authority and bipartisan
support for his policy goals.

In fact, Nixon's election

victory over Humphrey was by a narrow margin in popular
vote; 42.7 percent for Humphrey, and 43.4 percent for
Nixon. 13

If the ability to carry out policy goals is judged

by his party's voting strength in Congress, then Nixon
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clearly needed bipartisan support.

In both the House and

the Senate the Republican Party remained the minority party
throughout Nixon's entire presidency. 1 4
Election Year Politics
Nixon's October 1971 announcement of his intention to
visit Moscow by May 1972 not only created a deadline for
SALT (partly due to the expectations usually reserved for
summit meetings), but also prepared the way for the 1972
presidential elections.

Success in SALT would be a big plus

for Nixon come November.
Nixon would be just as anxious to show positive
results to Congress, lest it begin to withdraw its support
for new weapons programs.

Nixon was concerned about losing

his bargaining-chip leverage with the Soviets, due to
opposition with Congress.

The Senate had given its support

for the Safeguard ABM program by a margin of only one
vote.

1

~

This was a clear statement to the President that

Congress did not share his regard for bargaining-chip
diplomacy as the best way to achieve arms control, or
detente.
Nixon's announcement of the Moscow summit was
conveniently timed in order to gain a much needed boost in
his pre-election popularity ratings.

Although his

popularity among the American public was on average higher
than that of most of his predecessors, 1971 became the low
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point of his term.

Following the 1972 summit, however, his

approval rating jumped to about 60 percent (see Figure 3).
While Nixon had to deal with the constraint of a
Democratic majority in Congress throughout his entire term,
his re-election was also challenged by the fact that by
January 1972 the Republican Party in Congress was
outnumbered by Democrats by the widest margin in several
years. 16

Since Nixon's re-election rested on attracting a

large segment of cross-party voters there was a heightened
concern to demonstrate success as the "peace candidate."
Next to seeking a resolution to the Vietnam conflict, the
achievement of a SALT treaty offered a most convenient
strategy to secure that image.
Nixon and SALT I
Many of Nixon's characteristics are evidenced in U.S.
arms control behavior during the SALT negotiations.
Technological advances in nuclear weapons systems (ABMs,
MIRVs, new strategic bombers) threatened to disrupt the
relative stability in the military balance of the
superpowers in the late 1960s.

As the Soviets continued to

build their strategic forces to a level of parity with the
United States, Nixon saw arms control as the best way to
ensure a stable relationship.

Arms control, however, was

not seen as an end in itself.

Nixon's style of diplomacy,

"linkage,'' was to be applied to Soviet behavior, not only
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in other regions of the world, but to strategic goals, with
arms control concessions as incentives.
Another aspect of his negotiating style, similar to
linkage, was his advocacy of ''bargaining-chip"

diplomacy~

promoting research, development, and deployment of new
weapons systems in order to gain concessions from the Soviet
Union.
Explicit in Nixon's style is the fact that he did not
abandon his advocacy of superiority over the Soviet Union.
Although it was couched in more conciliatory terminology,
Nixon's own interpretation of parity and sufficiency meant
that U.S. forces must not be inferior, and that there be no
Soviet advantages with which to politically exploit the
United States. 17

Basically, these ideas amounted to a

realistic acceptance of parity as long as the United States
retained the military and political edge in deterrence.
This edge, as Nixon saw it, was being given away willingly
in President Johnson's SALT policy.
It was because of clear evidence of a growing Soviet
capability in 1969 that, he says, he decided in March 1969
to develop Safeguard, an ABM system better equipped to
defend U.S. ICBMs. 18

The opening of SALT was then delayed

until November in order to buy more time to elicit
Congressional support for a new weapons program at a time
when the defense budget was facing increasing cuts.
While the Safeguard program was primarily to be used
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as a bargaining chip in SALT, it was also essential to the
U.S. position favoring a comprehensive offensive/defensive
treaty.

By strengthening the U.S. position on ABM, which

the Soviets wanted to see stopped, Nixon planned to link
defense concessions to limitations and/or reductions in
Soviet offensive systems.
It was not only Nixon's pragmatism and style, however,
that guided U.S. behavior in SALT.

His paranoia and drive

for personal power led him to rely increasingly on a few key
people in policymaking--chiefly Kissinger.

Nixon loathed

the idea of allowing the bureaucracy its role in the
decisionmaking process.

He distrusted them, especially the

State Department and the Foreign Service.

According to

Kissinger, "Nixon considered (Secretary of State) Rogers'
unfamiliarity with the subject (foreign policy) an asset
because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in
the White House."19
As negotiations continued, Nixon came to rely on
Kissinger to such an extent that he began dealing
with key foreign leaders through channels that
directly linked the White House Situation Room to
the field without going through the State
Department--the so-called backchannels . . . Nixon
increasingly moved sensitive negotiations into the
White House where he could supervise them directly,
get the credit personally, and avoid the
bureaucratic disputes or inertia that he found so
distastefu1.20
While Nixon has been criticized for attempting to
expand the power of the President, for ignoring the
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bureaucracy and Congress, and for sidestepping the U.S. SALT
delegation, at times leaving them totally in the dark as to
U.S. negotiating positions, 21 it is probable that the
backchannel negotiations prevented a much longer, drawn out
SALT or even an eventual impasse had negotiations continued
in their original manner.

The Soviets were not budging at

all from their "ABM only" proposal, and a growth in Soviet
offensive systems was reported to be steadily rising.

It

could also be argued that the Soviets pref erred the use of a
more direct and unpublicized negotiating approach.

Thus,

the backchannel would have offered a more conducive
atmosphere for serious negotiations.
Analyzing Soviet Politics
A tendency in many analyses of the decisionmaking
process and leadership characteristics in Soviet politics
has been to employ analytic variations of comparative
bureaucratic approaches and "interest group" approaches; 22
and "power consolidation" approaches. 23

Often times,

studies that focus on comparative bureaucratic and interest
group approaches in Soviet politics have relied too much on
comparisons with the American political system.

Whereas all

bureaucratic institutions may be said to exhibit some
similar qualities (i.e., employee identification with his or
her organization, and inter-departmental "bargaining" and
"coalition building") , 2 4 the degree of direct participation
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in actual policymaking is not so easily analogized.
However, because of the unique "centralist" features of
Soviet politics (a traditionally ''rubber stamp" role of the
legislative bodies and a somewhat more collective but
independent authority vested in the executive) , 20 greater
attention to the role of the principal bureaucratic
institutions and their influences within the Politburo seems
in order.
The "power consolidation" approaches, on the other
hand, focus on strengthening political position through
coalition building and interest group support, patron-client
relationships, and purges of organization membership.
The Brezhnev Regime
The general attitude toward Leonid Brezhnev's
leadership characteristics is based on some combination of
the above approaches plus his personal characteristics:

an

overall conservative approach, in personal outlook, and
toward political reform; an ability to manage competitive
interests within the system, and; whenever possible, the
willingness and ability to augment his position of
authority.

Brezhnev was a devout communist, but a realist

in the sense that he advocated co-existence (rather than
unilateral antagonism) with the United States.
Within the various dichotomies ascribed to interest
groups or factions in Soviet politics, Brezhnev has been
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classified:

a "dove," as opposed to a "hawk"; 26 a

"realist," as opposed to a "traditionalist"; 27 "reformist,"
as opposed to "orthodox"; 28 a "diplomatist," as opposed to
"conservative." 29 and, "pragmatist," as opposed to
"conservative."30
On a more personal level, Brezhnev was egotistical,
had a thirst for power, was unfavorable toward change, and
not a man of great intellect.

According to Shevchenko, who

knew Brezhnev on a personal basis,
Brezhnev's vanity was gargantuan and he was happy to
nurture his own "cult of personality." His immodest
behavior and the marks of undeserved distinctions
and honors which he awarded himself were disgusting
to many; in his love for praise, medals and honorary
posts he surpassed even Khrushchev.31
Brezhnev's conservatism was partly a reflection of his
own background and the aging generation of the Stalin era,
members of which included Brezhnev and most of his Politburo
cadres.

The average age of full

(voting) members of the

Politburo rose from 58 to 68 from 1966 to July 1978, while
the average age of candidate (non-voting) members rose from
53 to 65 during the same period. 32

As Shevchenko notes:

The old men . . . had settled into an intensely
conservative pattern . . . , in which they feared and
would not tolerate any changes or new ideas; they
liked the reassurance of familiar slogans repeated
and repeated .
33
Brezhnev had learned early on how to survive in the
system as a Party apparatchik during the Stalin purges of
the 1930s.

He moved up through the ranks of the Party
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hierarchy not as an intellect or an innovator, but by
cultivating his political connections and winning the favor
of Khrushchev.

Thus, as Shevchenko explains, "Brezhnev was

simply one among many ordinary faces that from time to time
appeared and disappeared on the political horizon." 34

Even

as a Party leader, " . . . it was clear to all who knew him
that he was a man of limited intellect and ability." 3 !5
Brezhnev and SALT I
Perhaps, the three principle characteristics of the
Brezhnev regime as they relate to SALT were the constraints
prompted by intra-factional debate within the top
leadership, 36 the economic priorities of the leadership, and
the building of Brezhnev's power base during that period.
The Soviet decision to enter into negotiations with the
United States appears to have been made during a period when
Brezhnev had yet to achieve preeminence in the Politburo,
thus allowing considerable internal debate over policy
choices.

As Wolfe suggests the months between President

Johnson's invitation to the Soviets to begin negotiations in
January 1967 and the first Soviet announcement of their
willingness to negotiate in June 1968 were marked by an
internal debate within the leadership on the issue of arms
control.3 7

Since Brezhnev's position was not firmly

established until 1971, the early phases of SALT were
influenced by this debate.

This is evidenced by a "hold and
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explore" behavior, discussing issues in generalities, and a
tentativeness as to whether SALT should continue past the
first round.3e
Although Brezhnev was Party Secretary General, he did
not yet dominate foreign policy.

This area, which included

SALT, was directed by Premier Alexei Kosygin until 1971. 39
The fact that Kosygin was also "pro-arms control," however,
and the fact that a pro-arms control policy eventually won
out, cannot entirely explain Brezhnev's eventual domination
over foreign policy.
Clearly the difference between the two leaders lay in
their motives for arms control, with Brezhnev's ascendancy
being a tribute to his ability to manage competing interests
while strengthening his own position.

Kosygin linked arms

control to the reallocation of resources to light industry
and consumer satisfaction.

Brezhnev was committed to a

detente as part of a strategy to slow down U.S. military
programs, but also to maintain a high rate of development in
heavy industry.
To the military this direction was somewhat of a
departure from building a "favorable" relationship of
forces, but it was acceptable in comparison to that of
Kosygin.

With the tenacious baking of the military Brezhnev

succeeded in cutting back increased military spending in

1970. 40

Brezhnev gained further domination over the

military when the 24th Party Congress in 1971 failed to
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elect Dmitri Ustinov, head of the armaments industry, to
full membership in the Politburo.
By mid-1971 Brezhnev had consolidated his own position
but was bound by the constraints of having to appeal to
several interests.4 1

His credibility at home, particularly

with the pro-defense groups, made a SALT agreement all the
more a priority.

Assuming that Brezhnev correctly perceived

a SALT treaty as essential to Nixon's re-election, 42 the
motivation for the signing of SALT in 1972, prior
to the November elections, is clearer still.
THE SUBSYSTEM VARIABLES
It is generally accepted that the period of SALT I was
associated with a detente; 43 overall, a positive period in
East/West relations.

The subsystem data for 1969 through

1972 support this association (see Table I in the Appendix}.
The significance of this association, however, depends upon
whether detente acted more as a determinant of SALT.

Viewed

from the domestic perspective, the pursuit of a SALT
agreement was the keystone of detente; the agreements
themselves affirmed its reality and promoted its viability.
The subsystem perspective, however, presents a different
view.

Detente was responsible for the success of SALT.

No

matter how much policies toward an arms agreement were
encouraged domestically, SALT codified detente but did not
initiate it.
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Although the SALT process had been set in motion
during the Johnson administration, with preparations
underway for a US/Soviet summit meeting in the fall of 1968,
the political conditions were not yet conducive to bringing
the two sides to the negotiating table for formal talks.
The summit meeting was canceled by Johnson supposedly in
response to Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia.
Surely this event did nothing to promote East/West
relations, but neither did it reflect overall changes in the
subsystem relationships.
By 1968 there had been a general, albeit slow movement
toward an East/West detente, though much of the cold war
tensions remained.

A number of changes in the international

political environment can be cited which encouraged this
detente:

a growing rift in Sino/Soviet relations; a

European desire to relax East/West tensions, particularly on
the issue of German reunification; the questionable future
of NATO, caused by tensions both within Western Europe and
between the European allies and the United States over such
issues as the European Economic Community (EEC) and European
integration, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the unilateral
decision by the United States to adopt a "flexible response''
strategy for the defense of the alliance.
The perceived missile gap of the early 1960s had been
replaced by a perceived stability in the military balance,
although technological advances in nuclear weaponry (ABM,
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MIRVs, new strategic bombers, and ICBMs) threatened to
disrupt that balance in the near future.

With the continued

buildup of Soviet strategic forces, the United States was
being forced to accept the concept of parity in its
relationship with the Soviet Union.

Detente really did not

begin to build momentum until after 1967.

In December of

that year NATO adopted a new strategic policy of "flexible
response" and approved the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks
of the Alliance.

West European security concerns were

heightened as a result of the new strategy which was
perceived by many as America's growing unwillingness to
defend Europe in the event of a Soviet move into Europe.
"Flexible response" was also seen as making conventional war
in Europe more likely.

As Kissinger described the strategy,

The strategy had been accepted by our European
allies with extreme uneasiness and only after a
debate extending five years. They saw it correctly-as the symptom of growing reluctance by the United
States to use its nuclear forces. 44
The Harmel Report stated that "military security and a
policy of detente are not contradictory but complimentary,"
and that "allies are not obliged to subordinate their
policies to collective

decision." 4 ~

The significance of the

Report was that it explicitly called for an alliance policy
based on "parallel courses" rather than, what Beers terms, a
"common tack." 46

Western Europe would no longer be obliged

to simply mirror U.S. policy, but would, with U.S.
endorsement, pursue a more independent course toward common
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goals.

Although the Report may have alleviated somewhat the

tensions between the United States and Western Europe, by
formally opening the way for a more active West European
process of normalization with the East new tensions arose in
the alliance relationship over how best to achieve detente,
and the pace at which detente would be pursued.
DeGaulle had already made it clear that France
intended to pursue its own course independent from U.S.
policy, and had conveyed France's desire to seek better
relations with the Soviet Union. 47

West Germany began a

more active attempt of its own to further detente.

In 1968,

while Germany was still "being officially branded as a
hostile power seeking revenge and restoration of territorial
losses . . . ," 48 by the end of 1969 German Chancellor
Brandt's "Ostpolitik'' was in full swing.
were responding with equal enthusiasm.

And the Soviets
The success of a

European detente, however, particularly for West Germany,
rested on greater US/Soviet cooperation.

West European

pressure on the United States to actively engage in arms
control was thus intensified.

The United States, taking a

slower, more cautious approach to detente, nonetheless took
great note of its allies' concerns, if only for the
threatening implications that a separate West
European/Soviet detente had for U.S. security.
As the Soviet Union pursued a "selective detente"
policy 49 --to divide the alliance by courting Western Europe,
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the United States feared the possibilities of rising German
nationalism,oo West European neutralism, 01 and an eventual
"finlandization" of Western Europe. 02

Within this political

atmosphere the United States was faced with a challenging
dilemma:
how to maintain security while seeking to improve-for the first time--systematically--relations with
the East: how to reconcile our solidarity (alliance
unity) with a policy of detente.0 3
Kissinger's words not only reflect the policy dilemma
facing the United States at that time, but the fact that it
was viewed as a dilemma demonstrates both the priority of
alliance unity in U.S. security policy and the indirect role
of Western Europe on U.S. policymaking.

Whereas in 1968 the

United States was willing to hold back on arms control, as
it was apparently in the first months of the Nixon
administration, the political environment by late 1969
favored SALT negotiations as the logical policy alternative.
By the time of the opening round of talks in November 1969
the subsystem environment was characterized by a slightly
positive, but cautious adversarial relationship, a generally
positive alliance relationship, but with strong underlying
negative elements, and a relatively high degree of positive
behavior in the alliance/adversary relationship (see
Appendix Table II).
The second and third rounds of SALT in 1970, by
contrast, took place amidst a slightly negative adversarial
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relationship, and a highly positive alliance/adversary
relationship (see Appendix Table III).

This change in

conditions featured U.S. expansion of the Vietnam War into
Cambodia, signs of crisis in the Middle East, Soviet
criticism of movement toward a US/Chinese rapprochement,
growing West European independence from U.S. policy, and
continued Soviet effort to lure Western Europe away from the
United States.
Clearly the latter feature was most evident during
SALT, demonstrated by Soviet positions on such issues as
ABMs, MR/IRBMs, FBS, and British and French nuclear forces.
While the Europeans generally welcomed SALT as being
"consonant with efforts to secure a more general relaxation
of East/West tensions," they were concerned that a SALT
treaty "might sacrifice some part of its (American)
capability to protect allies," including their own
capability to protect

themselves.~ 4

At the outset of SALT the Soviets raised the issue of
American Forward-Based Systems (an area of U.S. advantage),
demanding that they be included in any agreement limiting
nuclear weapons systems.

At the same time they insisted

that their medium-range missiles aimed at Western Europe not
be included.

This they justified by their own definition of

strategic weapons.

Puzzled by this Soviet behavior Smith

asks, what did the Soviets expect to gain by raising this
issue?

Attempting an answer he concludes that,
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because the allies were so adamant about any reduction in
the U.S. commitment to Western

Europe.~

6

Another West European concern, one closely linked to
the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France, was
the ABM issue.

Not only were the development and deployment

of U.S. defensive systems perceived by Europeans as a move
to ''insulate" the United States from its allies, but a
Soviet defensive capability was seen as a threat to the
utility of British and French

forces.~

7

Obviously even a

limited number of Soviet ABMs would have a significant
effect on the comparatively small forces of Britain and
France combined.

The Soviet proposal calling for joint

retaliation against any country launching a provocative
attack further aggravated the British and French situations
by indirectly constraining the utility of their forces.
While the proposal was also directed at the Chinese, the
Soviets had likely considered the benefits of both.
The FBS debate continued into the third round of talks
in November 1970 as both sides held to earlier positions.
In December a Soviet proposal was conveyed via the
delegation heads that upon completion of an agreement both
sides would agree to adhere to a no first-strike policy.
This proposal was clearly designed with' the aim of isolating
Western Europe.

For the United States to officially adopt

such a policy would have antagonized the allies even more
than "flexible response" had.

The U.S. response to the
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proposal was predictable.

"

it would be inconsistent

with defensive commitments to our allies .

"~

8

The friction in the alliance relationship during 1970,
however, was not entirely negative.

It would be more aptly

described as confused--neutral, but volatile; equally likely
to improve or worsen.

Even as the United States was urging

its allies to increase their share of the cost of defense
and cautioning them against being too quick to pursue
detente, it was also nurturing their trust through the
reassurances of close consultation and the affirmation of
its alliance commitments in SALT.
Early in 1969 Nixon had promised the allies full
consultation.

The U.S. SALT delegation stopped first in

Brussels en route to Helsinki to confer with the allies.
Thereafter, briefings on the negotiations and U.S. positions
were carried out on a regular basis.

Nixon also kept his

promise for an extensive visit to Europe early in his first
term.

Before his trips to China and Moscow Nixon consulted

at length with allied leaders at the White House.

Although

some NATO members found that consultations with the Nixon
administration were "little more than a willingness to
inform others what it had already decided to do,"
consultations were somewhat successful in calming allied
"nervousness."~9

The West Europeans were in an uneasy position.

As

noted earlier, although they welcomed SALT, they remained
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apprehensive about a US/Soviet agreement which might lessen
America's alliance commitment.

Furthermore, any desire they

may have had to take on a larger role in NATO policymaking
and a more independent role in providing for their own
defense, was contradicted by the desires for a detente and
the undesirable costs of assuming a greater defensive role.
They too fully understood the political implications of an
East/West detente.

As Kissinger later warned, "an

atmosphere of detente removes the previous urgency for
allied cohesion."60
The West European/Soviet detente, however, was
sustained through 1970 with the alliance/adversary
relationship overall a positive one (see Appendix Table
III).

Among the more positive events were the opening of

bilateral negotiations between East and West Germany, the
beginning of four-power negotiations on Berlin, positive
movement toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
(MBFR) , and the signing of non-aggression treaties between
the Soviet Union and West Germany.

In October France and

the Soviet Union signed an accord to further develop and
expand relations, and to have periodic consultations.
Despite the passivity in SALT during 1970, much
progress was made in 1971, culminating in the SALT I
treaties of 26 May 1972.
overall

This period is associated with an

positive subsystem environment (see Appendix Tables
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IV and V).

The United States and the Soviet Union engaged

in a higher level of cooperation despite counter-productive
events (i.e., U.S. moves toward mending relations with the
PRC, and the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports.
The political environment in which SALT was achieved
had thus been established.
cooperation for momentum.

Ostpolitik relied on US/Soviet
The United States relied on

cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to maintain some
control over Ostpolitik and alliance unity.

The Soviet

Union relied on cooperation both with the United States and
Western Europe in order to relax NATO's raison d'etre and
constrain U.S. military programs.

SALT I was thus greatly

facilitated because the interaction of each actor's security
concerns, and their attendant policies, created conditions
favorable for arms control.
CONCLUSION
Viewed solely from the domestic perspective, SALT I
was the keystone of detente.

Implicit in this view is the

belief that without the political forces within the United
States and the Soviet Union acting in favor of SALT detente
would have quickly become a dead issue.

Certainly the

coincidence of SALT and the blossoming of the detente era is
strong evidence in favor of this position.

In addition,

since the policies of the Nixon administration and that of
Brezhnev both embraced philosophies of international order
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based on adaptation, peaceful coexistence, and conflict
management, in which arms control played a key role, it is
not difficult to arrive at conclusions which define the
success of SALT I as the result of bilateral relations.
This view, however, would be only partially correct.
If the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet
Union by 1969 were compelled toward cooperation and
conciliation, they must be seen as adapting and reacting to
sub-systemic influences more than the results of bilateral
or domestic factors.
The Ostpolitik of Western Europe somewhat frustrated
the implementation of Kissinger's balance of power
philosophy in which Western Europe was subjugated to U.S.
policy.

Western Europe was advancing its own policy of

detente separate from U.S. policy.

Western Europe saw SALT

as a way to allay its own fears of entrapment.

The Soviet

Union reacted by encouraging closer ties with Western
Europe.

SALT was used as a carrot to court Western Europe

and divide the alliance.

The United States reacted by using

SALT as a means of controlling alliance solidarity and West
European/Soviet ties.
According to the data in Figure 2, US/Soviet relations
peaked in 1971, but were slipping as the SALT I treaties
were signed.

Alliance relations appear to parallel

US/Soviet relations while West European/Soviet relations run
contrary.
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This supports the thesis that SALT I was preceded by
an environmental movement toward East/West detente already
underway by the late 1960s.

SALT I negotiations were

motivated by security perceptions, particularly those of
Western Europe, that sought an end to East/West
confrontation.

By 1970 alliance relations were low as the

United States and Western Europe followed distinct Soviet
policies.

Western Europe pursued Ostpolitik in reaction to

its concerns of entrapment.
welcomed Ostpolitik.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union

The United States, responding to

allied concerns and its own concern over warming West
European/Soviet relations, initiated SALT negotiations in
1969.

Alliance relations and US/Soviet relations rose

accordingly.
relationships.

Detente was a result of these changed
SALT I was the product of detente.
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CHAPTER III
SALT II
THE ISSUES OF SALT II
Less than six months after SALT I became official U.S.
and Soviet negotiating teams arrived in Geneva to begin SALT
II. 1

For the most part, these negotiations took place

within the framework of SALT I, the main objective being to
replace the Interim Agreement (due to expire in five years)
with a more comprehensive one that would remain in force for
a substantially longer period.
off in SALT I

Issues that were either put

(FBS, MR/IRBMs, MIRVs, Soviet MLBMs) or not

yet deemed strategically or technologically essential to the
purpose of SALT I

{Backfire Bomber, cruise missiles, or the

MX--"Missile Experimental") were brought up in SALT II.
Of immediate concern in SALT II was what many American
strategic planners and politicians alike saw as the failure
of SALT I; solving the problem of Soviet "heavies--their
MLBMs. 2

These missiles, they argued, threatened the

retaliatory utility of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs--the
backbone of the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.
Some limitation or reduction of these missiles quickly
became a U.S. priority, particularly in light of the fact
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that the Soviet Union would be left free to MIRV them.
Although U.S. MIRV technology far exceeded that of the
Soviet Union during SALT I

(which was one justification for

the launcher inequality in the Interim Agreement), it was
argued that once the Soviets did begin MIRVing, U.S.
missiles would be placed in an inferior position.
Because of this growing criticism of SALT I, Congress
had mandated that future agreements be arrived at on the
basis of numerical parity, or "equal aggregates.'' 3 a

This

meant taking into consideration both quantitative and
qualitative aspects of nuclear weapons systems (i.e.,
launchers, warheads, missiles, throw-weight, range,
accuracy) .
By June 1973 some general guidelines were worked out
between Nixon and Brezhnev in Washington D.C.

Together they

agreed to work toward permanent ceilings on offensive
strategic forces

(including qualitative factors),

a real mutual reduction of those forces.

and toward

They also agreed

upon 1974 as a deadline for concluding a SALT II treaty.

By

the summer of 1974, however, negotiations were bogged down.
But despite Nixon's resignation from office in August,
efforts to continue the SALT process were not given up.

In

fact, what was generally accepted as a "get acquainted
meeting" between President Ford and Brezhnev in Vladivostok,
turned out to be a significant step forward for SALT.
Principles agreed upon at Vladivostok gave a new impetus to
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progress in SALT and set the stage for the next four years
of negotiations.
A ceiling was established at 2400 for total offense
nuclear launch vehicles, with a sub-ceiling of 1320
launchers for MIRVs.

The Soviets dropped their demand that

an agreement include American FBS.

In return, the United

States agreed not to press for a reduction in Soviet
"heavies."

The ceiling of 2400 would also include heavy

bombers, a category in which the United States had
superiority.

A new deadline for concluding an agreement was

set for the end of 1975.
Two issues quickly became a major stumbling block for
the remainder of SALT II--the Soviet Backfire Bomber, and
the cruise missile. 4
definition.

The problems were primarily ones of

The Backfire's unique characteristics gave it a

medium bomber status, though it had intercontinental
{strategic) capabilities.

The cruise missile {still in the

developmental stage in 1974) did not have the range or speed
of ballistic missiles or heavy bombers.

But it could strike

the Soviet Union from forward bases in Europe.

Thus, by

Soviet definition, the cruise missile was a strategic
weapon.

In addition, 30-40 air-launched cruise missiles

(ALCMs) could be delivered by one bomber, a feature on which
grounds the Soviets insisted that such a bomber be counted
in the MIRV launcher sub-ceiling.
While the delegations in Geneva marked time discussing
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less ambiguous issues, no headway was made during 1975 on
the "gray area" status of the Backfire and cruise

missiles.~

In January 1976, Kissinger flew to Moscow anxious to break
the impasse and reach an agreement.

The result of his

meeting was an understanding that the United States would
count heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles within the
MIRV launcher ceiling of 1320 if the Soviets would accept
limitations on the Backfire.

This understanding, however,

was never allowed to provide the breakthrough in
negotiations that Kissinger had hoped for.

His concession

on the cruise missile was subsequently blocked by internal
pressure in the United States. 6

In February the United

States offered a counterproposal that the Vladivostok
agreements be ratified with a temporary resolution of the
Backfire and cruise issues.

The Soviets rejected the

proposal claiming they had made a deal with Kissinger.
Finally, with another treaty deadline past, the
negotiations moved through an ambiguous phase until March
1977.

The Carter administration then focused on three

options:

"Basic Vladivostok"--more or less what Kissinger

had arranged in January 1976; "Vladivostok Plus"--including
some accommodation of the Backfire, and: "Vladivostok
Minus"--excluding the Backfire and the cruise missile.

The

final decision became the "Comprehensive Proposal" which:
reduced both total launcher and MIRV launcher ceilings;
added a sub-ceiling of 550 for MIRVed ICBMs; reduced the
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number of Soviet heavy bombers to 150 (from 300); limited
the flight testing of existing ICBMs; banned mobile and new
ICBMs, and; excluded further limitations on the Backfire, if
the Soviets would restrict its mission to tactical only.
All cruise missiles would be limited to a range no greater
than 2500 km., but deployment of ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) would be acceptable in West Germany.

The

Soviets rejected the proposal.
Over the next two years the two sides did manage to
converge on several issues.

In April 1978 Secretary of

State Vance visited Moscow in an attempt to resolve the
remaining problem areas.

There was hope that a summit

meeting, and possibly a treaty, could be arranged by summer.
The United States agreed to a lowered ceiling of 2250 total
nuclear launch vehicles (but higher than the Comprehensive
Proposal) and the Soviets agreed to a 1200 MIRV launcher
ceiling.

They also dropped a demand that transfer of

weapons systems and technology be banned.

In its place a

U.S. proposed "circumvention" clause was adopted.
In May 1978 the Soviets accepted a freeze on the
maximum number of warheads per missile, the limit based on
the present number of warheads on each missile.

The Soviets

then proposed a ban on flight testing and deployment of all
new ICBMs except one, which would be limited to a single
warhead missile.

This was unacceptable to the United States

since it would have blocked the MX missile which had ten
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warheads.

In July, however, the Soviets compromised and

agreed to allow one new ICBM, MIRVed or not.

The United

States agreed, and at the same time abandoned a similar
proposal of its own to ban new SLBMs.

Such a ban would have

blocked the Trident II program.
By early September 1978 a treaty seemed to be within
reach.

The United States approached Moscow with a ''package"

deal with all but a few issues remaining to be resolved.
Over the next few months the talks focused on cruise
missiles, the Backfire, and treaty verification.

In late

September the Soviets offered to drop their 2500 km. limit
on ALCMs in exchange for a "straight line" range limit on
GLCMs and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) . 7

Shortly

thereafter, the Soviets dropped the 2500 km. limit on GLCMs
and SLCMs in return for a U.S. agreement to a 600 km. limit
in the protocol of the treaty.

The Soviets did not,

however, drop their right to upgrade the Backfire.
An October meeting in Moscow focused primarily on the
issue of verification.

In response to the Soviet practice

of encrypting some of its missile testing telemetry, the
United States insisted on banning any encryption that would
impede ''national means" of verification.

This would be

accomplished by the inclusion of a clause (similar to one in
SALT I) that prohibited the deliberate concealment of
missile telemetry which might impede verification.

By

December the verification issue, plus a U.S. insistence that
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a treaty include a Soviet statement of non-strategic
intentions for the Backfire, stalled the talks again.

By

the end of 1978, as expectations mounted for a summit
meeting, and a treaty, the talks were delayed for another
six months.

Following almost weekly negotiations, the

remaining issues were worked out and SALT II was finally
signed on 18 July 1979.
The treaty kept the 2400 ceiling on total launchers,
but included a reduction to 2250 by 1 January 1981.

The

sub-ceiling for MIRVs stayed at 1320, and included heavy
bombers equipped for cruise missiles with a range over 600
km.

A limit was set at 28 ALCMs per bomber.

Both GLCMs and

SLCMs were limited to 600 km. in the protocol to the treaty,
which would remain in force until 31 December 1981, unless
replaced by an earlier agreement.

MIRV launcher sub-

ceilings were set at 1200 for ICBMs, SLBMs, and Air to
Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), and at 820 for ICBMs
only.

Each side was allowed to determine its own mix within

those limitations.

No new type of ICBM was allowed, except

one new "light" ICBM.

The number of MIRV warheads was

capped at existing numbers.
Limitations were also agreed upon for modernization,
relocation, conversion, and reloading of ICBM launchers.
The circumvention clause was retained in Article 12 of the
treaty, as was the U.S. insistence to include a "no
deliberate concealment measures" clause in Article 14.
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Article 19 set the expiration date for the treaty at 31
December 1985.
The treaty also included a Soviet Statement that the
intercontinental capabilities of the Backfire would not be
utilized, and that its production rate would not exceed
thirty planes per year.

President Carter included a

statement that the United States considered these Soviet
commitments on the Backfire "to be essential to the
obligations assumed under the Treaty."

Finally a Joint

Statement on Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent
Negotiations was included with a reference to further
resolution of the issues designated in the protocol.
Senate debate over SALT II ratification immediately began
following the treaty signing and continued for the remainder
of 1979. 8

By Christmas recess, SALT II had not yet been

brought to a vote, and subsequently was never ratified.
THE POLITICAL LEADER CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE
Nixon (1973-1974)
By the time of the opening round of SALT II Nixon had
been re-elected by a landslide majority. 9

Having

interpreted the overwhelming victory as a clear mandate for
his policies, Nixon continued to govern in much the same
manner and style.

By the end of January 1973, however,

Nixon's popularity among the American public declined
steadily.

Following his April speech regarding the
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Watergate break-in, that rating dropped to its lowest point
since taking office.10
Regarding SALT II, the effect of Watergate on U.S.
arms control behavior must be seen as minimal, at least
until the summer of 1974.
usual.

Nixon's approach was business as

It may be speculated, however, that the 1973 summit

was purposefully predisposed toward conciliation and highly
celebrated in order to distract attention from Watergate,
thus highlighting the success of the administration's
foreign policy.

Whether or not this was the case in 1973,

it seems more probable that the 1974 summit in Moscow had
such motivations.

The Soviets by then, however, could not

have realistically agreed to further arms control measures
in light of the overwhelming uncertainty facing U.S.
leadership.

Despite the high expectations and publicity

surrounding the summit, very little was accomplished.
The Ford Administration
"Gerald Ford, the first appointed American President,
a pleasant, dull, open-faced man . . . ,"assumed the office
of President on 8 August 1974. 11

Contrary to what has been

considered an interregnum, 12 the Ford administration, at
least in regard to foreign policy, represented a
continuation of the policies of the Nixon administration.
The SALT II negotiations were absent of any radical
departure from the Nixon years.

Ford retained Kissinger as
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Secretary of State.

Ford's instructions were to move ahead

with SALT where Nixon had left off. 13

The Vladivostok

meeting, coming just a few months after Ford assumed office,
is demonstrative of the Ford administration's desire to
maintain consistency and continuity in arms control policy.
It is also reflective of the desire to renew a detente that
was becoming increasingly a target of domestic criticism.
There were, of course, several real constraints on the
Ford Presidency.

Beside the fact that he was not elected,

there was the debate over the possible consequences of the
U.S. incursion into Cambodia, and later the U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam.

These issues, together with the Watergate

affair, severely undermined the Office of the President, at
home and abroad.
Ford also had to deal with stronger Democratic
majorities in both houses of Congress.

The composition of

the 94th Congress following the 1974 elections included more
than a twenty percent increase in House Democrats as well as
establishing a commanding sixty percent Democratic majority
in the Senate.14
Ford thus found it difficult to continue the policies
of his predecessor.

The 1975 deadline for a SALT II treaty,

set at Vladivostok, came and went with no sign of a
breakthrough in negotiations.

Kissinger, whose association

with the Nixon era, and whose world views had become
associated with America's failure in Vietnam, also came
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under attack.

In Richard Barnet's words, "the man who made

foreign policy famous no longer seemed to be able to make
foreign

policy."

1

~

Unable to find a compromise solution to

the negotiating obstacles posed by the Backfire and cruise
missile, Kissinger visited Moscow in January 1976 to attempt
a last ditch effort.
Once again the predisposition toward election year
politics was an important motivating factor in the pursuit
of a SALT agreement.

As Ford himself alluded to,

A SALT accord had been eluding us for more than a
year, and it was vital that we make a final attempt
to bridge our differences over the Backfire and
cruise.
success with SALT . . . would go a long way
toward ensuring my election in 1976.16
By 1976, however, detente, SALT, and Kissinger were
under attack from members of both major parties.

By March

detente was a term no longer in vogue, and even Ford
discarded it from his campaign rhetoric. 17

Criticism of

detente, as a one-way street in favor of the Soviet Union,
was substantiated by Soviet actions in Angola and the
detection of new Soviet missile deployments.
SALT negotiations continued.

But as Talbott has

observed, "Kissinger was on a shorter leash . . . as he
negotiated with Gromyko." 19

Kissinger's attempt at a treaty

by agreeing to limitations on the cruise missile was viewed
by many U.S. policymakers as an unacceptable concession to
the Soviets.

Mounting domestic pressures against detente

disallowed an American compromise in SALT.

The Soviets, on
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the other hand, seemed content to hold out for a favorable
arms control deal in a U.S. election year.

SALT II was thus

resigned to an ambiguous state until March 1977.
The Carter Administration
According to some post-presidential analyses, Jimmy
Carter has been described, in most general terms, as "a good
man," but with "little sense of direction." 19

While this

description is simplistic, it does capture the ambiguity and
vacillation associated not just with the man, but with the
administration and its policies.

The question that must be

asked then, is to what degree were these characteristics a
part of Carter's personality, his political style, his
participation in decisionmaking, and the constraints on his
scope of authority?

Certainly Carter's low leadership

rating was, in part, a reaction to his own ambivalence and
naivete.

That ambivalence, a feature of the Carter

administration in general, must also be seen as a reflection
of a larger political milieu.

In foreign policy Carter fell

victim to his own perceptions of the world.

But he also

fell victim to the political environment in which he
governed.
The image of Jimmy Carter as a "good man" reflects his
honesty, his open morality, and sincere desire to solve the
problems that beset the world.

He was the "unknown
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candidate," a "slender peanut farmer with sandy hair and
gleaming teeth" who had,
run against Washington . . . promising a government
as good as the people, in which the President would
keep his office door open and never lie. 20
These personal characteristics were undoubtedly
important factors in Carter's election in the post-Watergate
era.

But these same characteristics tended to work against

him once he assumed office.

The political realities of

foreign policy, of which he had limited experience,
conflicted with his conscience; a conflict he was unable to
reconcile.

As Barnet notes,

Jimmy Carter turned out to be a man who abounded in
good qualities he could neither discipline nor
integrate. A decent, genuinely moral man, his
success in translating his morality into politics
was limited . . . . By the end of his term the image
of steely determination and managerial competence
had given way to one of vacillation and confusion. 21
This was evident in Carter's foreign policy.

As

Barnet continues, "the foreign policy mirrored the man.
admirable goals, like his own admirable character traits,
collided with one another."2 2
As the first post-Watergate President, Carter's
authority was closely scrutinized, under the watchful eye of
the public and Congress.
scrutiny.

Carter's personality obliged the

In contrast to Nixon, Carter invited a broad

policy input from the Executive and the Legislative branches
of government.

Although he was obliged to adopt more of a

consensus style of policymaking, he seemed naturally
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inclined to rely on his advisors.

Because of this style,

policies were continually filled with ambiguities and
inconsistencies; a natural result of trying to please
everyone.

As for his own input in foreign policy, Carter

had little to offer, relying instead on a "cabinet
government . "2 a
Carter understood his own dilemma.

In his memoirs, he

expressed an uncertainty about the problems he faced as a
result of Watergate and his own experience as an outsider
among Washington social circles.

He realized Congress would

not "embrace me as a long-awaited ally in the Executive
Branch."2 4

Although he benefitted from a Democratic

majority in both Houses, his election had been a narrow
one.

2

~

As Carter recalls,

I generally doubted that I had a broad public
mandate to carry out the programs I had espoused. 26
Carter and SALT II
These characteristics of the Carter administration
thus directly affected U.S. behavior in SALT II
negotiations.

Though little criticism can be leveled

against Carter's desire that SALT be unique (his own
formula), the U.S. position in SALT reflected an openness
and ambivalence that frustrated America's allies, whose
growing perceptions of insecurity demanded consistency and
strong leadership from Washington.

If Carter's foreign

policy was predominately influenced by the Trilateral
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Commission (TriCom) as some have claimed, 27 then Carter's
personal style and the political environment were out of
sync with that policy.
Within the first week of his term, Carter ordered
preparations for a renewal of SALT negotiations.

Over the

next several weeks, as Carter turned his attention to other
foreign policy matters, SALT was left to the devices of
various bureaucratic agencies. 28

The end result was the

Comprehensive Proposal which went further than the
Vladivostok accords by significantly lowering the
established ceilings of nuclear weapons. 29

Despite the

pressures to build an arms agreement on the basis of
Vladivostok, Carter was determined to make SALT II his own.
He refused to simply "cross the t's and dot the i's'' on a
document that was mostly Kissinger's work. 30
His campaign was, after all, largely critical of
Kissinger, both in negotiating style and his world views.
But Carter seemed to go out of his way to avoid actions that
may have been likened to the two previous administrations.
Ironically, the ''openness" and anti-Kissinger style proved
to be a major source of the contradiction and ambivalence
that the Carter administration exuded throughout the
remainder of SALT II.
One contradiction arose from the administration's
aversion to the use of "linkage" in negotiating style.

In

part, due to the differences between Kissinger's world views
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and those of Brzezinski's, any linkage of other issues to
arms control simply made it more difficult to insulate arms
control, and hence, to reach an agreement.

The Carter

administration soon found its policies at odds with one
another as Carter's zeal for human rights adversely affected
US/Soviet relations and progress in SALT II. 31
Suspicions of the administration's openness were
raised when, shortly before Secretary Vance was to present
the Comprehensive Proposal to the Soviets in Moscow, Carter
announced to the United Nations General Assembly the central
features of the Proposal, plus fall back contingencies in
the event the Soviet Union rejected it outright.

This

action may have been a result of the anti-secrecy uprising
after Watergate and revelations of certain CIA operations.
Carter may have felt he needed to appease the American
public and restore some credibility to the Presidency.

The

primary motivation may have been Carter's own penchant for
openness, morality, and honesty.
Ironically, while the motivation was likely a
combination of all these factors, the result was a
strengthening of political ammunition for an increasing
anti-detente sentiment within the United States.

The

discordant character of the domestic political attitude
toward the expectations of the President and toward detente
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simply compounded the political indecisiveness and ambiguity
produced by Carter's moral passion to do the "right" thing.
Pressures were mounting to appear tougher with the
Soviet Union.

Helmut Schmidt's speech criticizing a

US/Soviet arms deal that sacrificed European security
pointed up the growing concerns of NATO members.
Domestically, pressures from newly created organizations
such as the Committee on the Present Danger and Coalition
for Peace Through Strength sought to re-address the
perceived military weaknesses of the West.

Production of

the neutron bomb was adopted as the solution to the
perceived imbalance in Europe, and as a bargaining chip in
SALT.

Having pressured West Germany into going along with

the neutron bomb production, and possible deployment, Carter
suddenly changed his mind and decided to cancel production.
Once again perceptions of vacillation and confusion in the
administration were the result.

Carter simply did not want

his administration labeled as one that made bombs "that kill
people but leave buildings intact." 3 2
Despite the signals of confusion, to allies and the
Soviets alike, negotiations continued.
a summit meeting by summer 1978.

Hopes were high for

With an upcoming

Congressional election, however, there were hopes, even
among those Senators in favor of SALT, that a treaty
ratification debate could be delayed until after the
election.

As Vance suggests, there was a strong feeling
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among pro-SALT Senators that their re-election rested, in
part, on taking a harder line on Soviet policy 33
Failure to Ratify SALT II
The achievement of a SALT treaty in June 1979,
followed by the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify it,
should not seem too surprising given the confusion and
incoherence in Carter's foreign policy.

On the one hand,

the moral motivation to seek arms control, and the hopes
that it would ensure a more trusting relationship between
the superpowers, helped to overcome the many negotiating
obstacles leading to an agreement.

On the other hand, the

anti-detente forces in the United States, strengthened by
Soviet actions in Cuba and Afghanistan, had the effect of
neutralizing any real trust between the two countries that
the conclusion of the treaty may have provided.3 4
Secretary Vance made clear the administration's desire
for SALT II ratification when he stressed the need to
appease the Senate.
If Carter would decide to deploy the MX in a mobile
basing mode, agree to an increase in the defense
budget, and acquiesce in several conditions
acceptable to the administration in the Resolution
of Ratifications he would satisfy many of the
critics.

3

~

Vance argued that SALT II ratification failed not
because of "fatal flaws" in the treaty itself, but because
the opponents were successful in linking the treaty to the
need to restrain Soviet actions in other countries.36
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Carter testifies to this argument in his memoirs, citing
"the antagonism that Soviet action in Afghanistan had
kindled in our country. "37
Rather than continue to pursue arms control for its
own sake, moral or strategic, Carter had bowed to the
linkage of SALT II and Afghanistan, a linkage for which he
blames Congress.

However, in a television speech on 4

January 1980 Carter stated that "the world simply cannot
stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with
impunity.

Neither the United States nor any other nation

. . . can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet
Union."38
Carter had suddenly switched positions,

joining those

same critics who had argued that arms control must be used
as a "carrot" to moderate Soviet behavior elsewhere.

But

1980 was also an election year, and Carter had decided not
to risk def eat by pursuing an arms agreement he believed was
the "most detailed, far-reaching, comprehensive treaty in
the history of arms control," and an " . . . absolute
indispensable precondition for moving on to . . . more
significant cuts under SALT III."39
Rather than appearing as if "I'm down in the trenches
fighting for my political life," 40 during the 1980 campaign,
Carter withdrew the SALT ratification vote from the Senate.
Consistent with the characterization of his administration
as one of vacillation, ambivalence, and ambiguity, Carter
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then imposed a U.S. grain embargo on the Soviet Union,
further appeasing Soviet hard-liners in Congress, while
isolating one of his natural constituents--the farmer.
Brezhnev (1973-1979)
Throughout SALT II Brezhnev retained his position as
the undisputed head of the Communist Party and as leader of
the Soviet Union.

The durability of his authority, however,

rested not only on his ability to manage competing
interests, but also on the success of ambitious domestic
programs that relied heavily on factors not completely
within his power to control.

Perhaps the most important

factor for Brezhnev was the continuation of detente.
Domestic programs to improve consumer satisfaction and
economic efficiency relied on favorable weather conditions
for agricultural production, clearly a factor not within his
control.
factor.

Detente, however, was a somewhat more controllable
It was deemed essential to economic improvement

since it was intended to provide the availability of Western
capital, credit, technology, not to mention a more relaxed
political atmosphere in which concentration on domestic
programs could be more easily afforded.
Both the weather and detente proved mostly favorable
for the success of Brezhnev's programs in the first years of
SALT II.
1976.

Record harvests were recorded in 1973 and again in

Detente produced new trade agreements with the United
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States, Western Europe, and Japan.

On the negative side,

however, the Jackson-Vanik amendment linking U.S. credits
and trade to Soviet emigration policy, plus a severe drought
in 1975, strengthened the position of Brezhnev's critics
within the top leadership.
Brezhnev's Detente Policy
Following the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in February
1976, Brezhnev's position emerged unchallenged.

But it does

seem likely that by 1976 there was serious doubt about both
his ability to govern and the credibility of detente.

The

result of the SALT I debate among the Party leadership in
1971 was a tentative compromise between pro-detente forces
and the more orthodox ideologues.

In exchange for support

for his programs, Brezhnev was obliged to allow an
increasingly broader participation of views in
decisionmaking.

In 1971 no Politburo position belonged to a

ranking member of either the military or state security. 41
By 1973 Marshall A. Grechko, the Minister of Defense, and Y.
Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, were elevated to full
Politburo status.

Ustinov was later promoted to full

membership in 1976.42
The detente atmosphere began showing clear signs of
erosion by 1976.

Brezhnev's ability to rule was further put

in question after he suffered a stroke in 1975 and was
absent from office for several months.

Despite the setbacks
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Brezhnev remained committed to detente, "determined to push
forward with an increasing dependence on foreign sources of
capital, technology, and consumer goods." 43

He responded to

political challenges against him with moves to reinstate and
consolidate his own power. 44

By 1980, as Breslauer

concludes, Brezhnev assured himself of "near-total consensus
of perspectives'' among the top leadership. 4 5
Brezhnev and SALT II
Because of detente's key role in Brezhnev's domestic
policies, it should not be surprising that there is some
parallel between the leadership characteristics of the
Brezhnev regime and Soviet behavior in arms control during
SALT II.

The first years following SALT I were marked by

internal support for Brezhnev's policies, as well as the
overall success of those policies.

Amidst expanding trade

and easing Soviet threat perceptions in the West, SALT
proceeded smoothly through the 1973 summit and the
Vladivostok agreements in 1974.
The mid-SALT II period, however, was offset by a
toughening of the Soviet negotiating position and subsequent
stagnation period.

This behavior corresponds to

accommodations by Brezhnev to allow ranking military and
state security members into the highest policymaking
positions.

It also corresponds to the weakening of

Brezhnev's position following his stroke in 1975.

In
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addition, Soviet behavior must also be seen as reacting to
U.S. politics, the succession of leadership, the rise of
anti-detente attitudes, and Carter's human rights campaign.
These factors could only have bolstered Brezhnev's critics,
forcing a more cautious, tougher arms control position.
The latter SALT II period coincides with Brezhnev's
power consolidation in reaction to signs of failure with
detente and its relation to the success of domestic
programs.

More military and traditionalist pressure at this

time likely had the effect of compromising Brezhnev's
detente policy for direct involvement in Afghanistan, Cuba,
and a more rapid buildup of SS-20 missiles.

Brezhnev's

signature on SALT II must be seen then as a demonstration of
his efforts at that time to re-establish his authority and
to revive detente.

Within the Party leadership, Brezhnev

was moved to demonstrate to the "traditionalists" that the
"realist" policy of detente was still the most viable
solution to the domestic and foreign interests of the Soviet
Union. 4 s
THE SUBSYSTEM VARIABLES
SALT II began in an atmosphere of East/West
cooperation (see Appendix Table V).

To be sure, the fact

that the conclusion of the SALT I agreements helped
establish an optimistic beginning for SALT II cannot be
ignored.

The signing of SALT I codified the US/Soviet
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detente, and greatly contributed to furthering the West
European/Soviet detente.

But while there was, as yet, no

cause for alarm in alliance relations (see Appendix Table
V) , the implications for the alliance in an atmosphere of
detente were of some concern.

The United States had

negotiated and concluded an arms control agreement with the
Soviet Union thus alleviating West European concerns about
their own detente with the East.

But would an expanded and

more durable detente lead to a less dependent Western Europe
on the United States, and instead, to closer ties and
dependence on the Soviet Union?

Could the two adversarial

relationships, with their distinct interpretations of
detente, maintain an environment of cooperation without
negatively affecting alliance unity?

SALT II became the

forum both for testing alliance unity and detente.
The Test of Detente
In the 1970s detente and changing West European
security perceptions created a dilemma for U.S. and Soviet
policy in SALT II.

Both arms control and detente are

policies designed to maximize security by means of mutual
restraint and cooperation.

From the subsystem perspective,

however, detente is afforded a different meaning to each
actor.

For the West, detente was never intended to carry

adversarial cooperation to the point of alliance
dissolution, though it sought to accommodate some West
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European independence from the United States.

For the most

part, the American interpretation of detente was for both
superpowers, through bilateral arrangements, "to act
responsibly," and "not to try to change the balance of power
through unilateral action." 47
For the Soviets, detente sought to maximize tensions
within the alliance and constrain American resolve against
an expanded role in international affairs.

As Ulam has

explained Soviet policy, "detente is a process rather than a
specific agreement, or sets of agreements." 48

Arms control

agreements merely perpetuate detente so that broader goals
may be realized.

Within Hassner's offensive/defensive

framework for Soviet policy, the Soviets sought to make
unilateral gains as long as they perceived the West as
divided and weak, and the United States unwilling or unable
to provide the leadership necessary for alliance unity.49
Griffiths draws a similar conclusion.

From his analysis

involving the domination of an ''activist trend" within the
Soviet leadership, detente, as a policy of limited
cooperation,
serves as an effective form of conflict in that it
creates an East-West climate favouring the
exacerbation of internal differences within NATO,
the defection of support for high levels of defense
preparedness in the United States and Western
Europe, and a reluctance on the part of Western
governments to take action in local conflicts that
jeopardizes the prospects for cooperation with the
East . . . . 50
For the Soviet Union, detente, via SALT, served as the
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"diplomatic route'' to an improved international position.
SALT served to disrupt alliance cohesion by acting upon West
European concerns, and America's dilemma in dealing with
them.

This included continued cooperation with the United

States, encouraging tensions between Western Europe and the
United States, and accommodating a separate West EuropeanSoviet detente.

Within the context of the alliance dilemma

mentioned above, a dilemma for Soviet policy exists in much
the same way as it does for the United States.

West

European fears of abandonment or entrapment may actually
encourage alliance unity rather than disunity if Soviet
actions are perceived as threatening West European security.
This is the case whether Soviet policy emphasizes
cooperation or conflict with the United States.
Changed West European Security Concerns
Much of SALT II can be viewed in the context of the
opportunities and dilemmas that faced each actor as their
security policies evolved during the 1970s.

As the

subsystem data support, the period of SALT II was
accompanied by a general trend toward worsening adversarial
relations (refer to Table VI in the Appendix, and Figure 2).
SALT II reflected those trends.
The continuation of the detente in which SALT II began
was recognized by many as a major test for alliance unity.
Concerned about unity, U.S. policy in 1973 stressed the
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reaffirmation of its relations with Western Europe.

As

Kissinger stated,
We had decided to make 1973 the Year of Europe, to
reaffirm our alliance ties with the Atlantic
Community--and also Japan. We would show that these
ties were stronger and deeper than the tentative new
relations with Communist countries. On the basis of
Alliance cohesion and vitality we would test the
real opportunities for detente.~ 1
Over the next few years alliance relations were
severely tested.

As Soviet policy took advantage of

strained alliance relations, not to mention Soviet
perceptions of American weakness in Vietnam, SALT II, in
turn was significantly affected.

In 1973, the United States

and the Soviet Union continued to expand areas of
cooperation with nine separate agreements being signed
during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting that summer.

But

while West Europeans generally welcomed arms control
efforts, they viewed the fact that SALT II would be based on
maintaining a strategic balance in mutual destructive
capability with great caution.

Without America's nuclear

guarantee to rely on, they saw themselves more vulnerable to
a Soviet threat, if not militarily, then certainly
politically.
One of the nine bilateral agreements signed during the
summit, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War,
"implied that the United States was more interested in
Soviet-American arms control than its security commitment to
NAT0."~

2

The risk of nuclear destruction may have been
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lessened somewhat by the agreement, but the extended nuclear
guarantee to Western Europe was based on a ''non-commitment"
to a no first-use strategy.

This agreement seemed to

undermine that strategy.
Other events in the early 1970s further contributed to
the erosion of Atlantic relations.

In October 1973 the Arab

oil embargo and the Israeli-Egyptian conflict highlighted
the differences in strategic interests between the United
States and Western Europe.

Because of the disparity in

dependence on OPEC oil, no common alliance action could be
arranged.

In lieu of a U.S. proposal for a counter-

coalition to OPEC, Western Europeans, seeing such an action
as too great a risk, rushed to make bilateral deals with
individual OPEC nations.

Disagreement also arose over the

issue of West European cooperation with the United States
and its policy to aid

Israel.~

3

Still further anxieties

developed over the lack of consultations or even an advance
notice from the United States during the military alert of
October

25th.~4

Soviet and U.S. Reaction
Following the climactic summit of 1973 SALT II
negotiations stagnated until November 1974.

During that

time Soviet policy appeared all too willing to make demands
on the United States that might create further divisions
among NATO allies and force U.S. concessions in the arms
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talks.

Beside the speculative, perhaps more obvious motive

to restrain potential Chinese nuclear capabilities, the
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was also aimed at
fueling West European concerns of abandonment.

Beyond that,

the Soviet Union continued to push the issue of American
forward-based systems in Europe as it had during SALT I.
At the Vladivostok meeting in November 1974, the
Soviets dropped their FBS demand but acquired a U.S.
agreement not to press for the inclusion of a Soviet cutback
in ''heavy" missiles.

From the subsystem perspective, the

FBS issue must be seen as more than simply a Soviet
bargaining chip in arms control negotiations.

By remaining

adamant on their FBS position the Soviets might have held
out for U.S. concessions that sacrificed West European
security.

Indeed, the political gains from such a

concession could have outweighed any quantitative or
qualitative strategic arms limitation that the United States
might have conceded.
The United States, however, did not retreat from its
promise to the allies not to negotiate weapons systems
committed to the European theater.

Such a stalemate in

negotiations over the FBS issue would only have frustrated
SALT II, and the Soviets required progress in arms control
in order to keep detente alive.
Because of the desire for continuity in detente, the
Ford-Brezhnev meeting in Vladivostok, and the agreements
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that accompanied it, were of no great surprise.

For their

own reasons, both the Ford administration and the Brezhnev
regime were anxious to keep detente and arms control alive.
Besides the agreed-upon ceilings for offensive systems, a
new deadline for a SALT II treaty was set for 1975.

SALT II

had entered into a new phase with the basis of a treaty
established at Vladivostok.

Beneath this accomplishment,

however, lay deeper political motivations and intentions.
Despite the emerging criticisms of detente within the
United States, and the political setback resulting from the
Jackson-Vanik amendment, the Soviet Union perceived its
position in the world to be strengthening, while the West
continued to show signs of weakness and disarray.
Watergate, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, disunity
in NATO over issues in Cyprus, Spain, and Portugal, and the
economic and energy crises, all gave credence to Soviet
perceptions that the "correlation of forces" had swung in
their

favor.~~

At the same time, Soviet policy continued to

nurture its detente with Western Europe vis-a-vis the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and
talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) .
Two major obstacles to SALT II came to the foreground
as a result of the change, or perceived changes, in the
international environment.
and the cruise missile.

These were the Backfire bomber

As was discussed earlier, the

problem was one of definition; the weapons systems were
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somewhere between strategic and tactical--in the "gray area"
of arms control.

The Vladivostok agreements had placed

heavy bombers (strategic) under the 2400 launcher ceiling.
This included the American B-52 and the Soviet Mya-4 and Tu20 (the Bison and the Bear).

The U.S. F-111 was deployed in

Europe, thus outside SALT II limitations.
yet, in the developmental stages.

The B-1 was, as

The Backfire's

characteristics, however, such as length, weight, wingspan,
range, and payload, placed it in the gray area between
medium and heavy.

Although the Soviets claimed its

intentions were for theater operations only, the Backfire
had strategic

capabilities.~

6

The Vladivostok agreements did not mention cruise
missiles per se, although an agreement was made to include
ballistic air-to-surf ace missiles of a range exceeding 600
km. under the 2400 launcher

ceiling.~

7

Following

Vladivostok, the Soviets interpreted the agreement as
including cruise missiles, whereas the United States
insisted upon no

limitations.~

8

As Burt suggests, one of the possible motivations of
the Soviets in demanding that all cruise missiles be limited
was to restrict its potential deployment in a tactical, or
European

mode.~

9

Because of the difficulty in cruise

missile verification, any treaty would most likely have to
count strategic and tactical deployments together.

In this

manner, the Soviets would have gained restrictions on
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American FBS, thus feeding West European concerns of
abandonment.

At the same time, the Soviets would have been

free to deploy the Backfire in a tactical mode, thus
strengthening their European position, militarily and
politically.
Consistent with this thesis of Soviet motivation in
SALT II was a rejection on their part in November 1975 of a
U.S. compromise proposal to count both the cruise and
Backfire "against one another in equal numbers above the
2400 level under an additional ceiling of 200-300." 60

This

ceiling would have only applied to longer range missiles and
not to tactical versions.

Throughout 1975, therefore, SALT

II was inflicted with paralysis due to Soviet willingness to
push for greater political gains encouraged by disunity
within the United States, and between alliance partners.
The Decline of Detente
The era of detente had already reached its peak by
1971 (see Figure 2) and by 1974 US/Soviet cooperation turned
steadily toward conflict (see Appendix Tables VIII-XIII).
Alliance relations stabilized somewhat by 1976 (see Figure
2) and a greater sense of unity was restored amidst a
renewed Western resolve against an increasing Soviet threat
perception, particularly in Western Europe.
In the 1976 Presidential campaign, detente became a
term that was no longer politically advantageous to use.

By
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1978 Western Europe was in "open opposition" to SALT II and
its implicit disregard for European security.61

NATO also

agreed on the necessity to counter the buildup of Soviet
forces in Europe, 62 particularly in light of continued
Soviet deployments of the SS-20. 63
By the late 1970s, Soviet policy was being forced to
adapt to a changed environment.

Western Europe was now

asking the United States to readdress a perceived imbalance
in Europe, which US/Soviet cooperation had failed to deal
with.

Supported by European fears, anti-detente forces in

the United States were quick to adopt measures to deploy new
weapons in Europe.

The cruise missile, primarily a

bargaining chip for Carter, was now seen as essential for
European deployment.

A new missile, the Pershing II, also

was earmarked for Europe.
In April 1978, the Soviets dropped their demand that
weapons technology transfer be banned.

In its place, a

circumvention clause, favored by the United States, was
used.

In May the Soviets accepted a freeze on the number of

warheads allowed per missile, and in July further
compromises were worked out.

In December, the United States

demanded the inclusion of a Soviet Statement committing the
Backfire to tactical usage only.

A compromise was also

reached on cruise missiles.
In June 1979 SALT II was signed, though largely a
result of changed political relationships.

The two-track
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decision of NATO re-established an alliance unity, albeit an
ambiguous one, 64 not realized since the early 1970s.
CONCLUSION
As US/Soviet relations remained generally positive for
the first few years after the signing of SALT I, it is
interesting to note the coincidence between the negotiations
and signing of SALT II, and the gradual decline of US/Soviet
cooperation through the mid and latter 1970s.

If the same

argument is used that SALT was the keystone of detente, SALT
II should have preserved, or even rejuvenated, positive
US/Soviet relations.
From the domestic perspective, it might be argued that
it was the Carter administration's mishandling of arms
control, bad negotiating, and misjudgment of Soviet
intentions which brought about the strong reaction to
detente.

Again the argument is only partially correct.

The

subsystem perspective shows that the decline of detente and
the failure of SALT II to be ratified were also due to
changes in security perceptions.

The Soviet buildup of SS-

20s and failure of SALT II to address European security
concerns testifies to the fact that alliance solidarity was
being weakened by East/West detente.

Demands were then

made, not for arms control, but for new arms deployments.
While the Carter-Brezhnev summit in 1979 was highlighted by
the signing of SALT II, NATO leaders and the United States
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Congress were addressing concerns over American abandonment
of Western Europe.
The blame for the failure of SALT II, therefore,
partly lies in the inability to have foreseen the possible
or likely effects of detente from the viewpoint of the
subsystem perspective.
Not only did detente test alliance relations, but
US/Soviet relations tested the durability of detente.

Both

domestic and subsystem factors played significant roles.
The momentum of detente and SALT I carried over into 1974
even as alliance unity was strained by the Arab oil embargo,
the Israeli-Egyptian War, and Nixon's resignation.

By the

time of the Vladivostok meeting in 1974, all three
relationships were on a positive trend (see Figure 2).
Following Vladivostok, however, US/Soviet relations steadily
declined while alliance relations vacillated up and down
reflecting both growing concerns of abandonment and
ambiguity and confusion in U.S. policy.
The level of West European/Soviet cooperation fell as
Western Europe became more fearful of Soviet intentions.

An

interesting observation is that US/Soviet and alliance
relations parallel each other through 1975, then run counter
through 1979 (see Figure 2).

This suggests both West

European confusion over U.S. policy and U.S. confusion over
alliance policy after 1975.

It also suggests that the

detente in US/Soviet relations declined as alliance unity
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became strained by West European perceptions of abandonment.
In addition, whereas it was West European/Soviet relations
that ran counter to US/Soviet and alliance relations from
1969 to 1974, from 1975 through 1979 alliance relations
generally ran counter to US/Soviet and West European/Soviet
relations (see Figure 2).

While US/Soviet relations turned

toward confrontation, both sides' domestic policies held to
a desire for a SALT II treaty.

Western Europe was then

experiencing a period of confusion.

Security perceptions of

entrapment (that arms control efforts were giving way to
confrontation) were mixed with perceptions of abandonment
(that a SALT II treaty would constrain or remove the U.S.
commitment to Europe).

Alliance unity was supported both by

US/Soviet cooperation in arms control negotiations
(flexibility and compromise) and US/Soviet confrontation
(impasse in arms control due to uncompromising positions in
questions regarding European security).

Consequently,

alliance relations turned downward following Schmidt's
speech criticizing SALT II for failing to address European
concerns, and following the signing of SALT II.
Both U.S. and Soviet domestic policies favored the
signing of SALT II, but not enough in the United States for
ratification.

The environment in which SALT II was

negotiated was one of growing confrontation in US/Soviet and
West European/Soviet relations, and confusion in alliance
relations.

The alliance called for new arms control
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negotiations to address concerns of entrapment, then called
for reassurance from the Unites States to address concerns
of abandonment.
If detente was a major test of alliance unity, so too
detente was a test for arms control.

Whereas changes in

NATO security perceptions prompted a re-evaluation of
detente, the success of SALT II likewise succumbed to the
call for alliance unity.
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commitment to European defense. West Europeans felt that
U.S. missiles might not have to be deployed whereas the
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CHAPTER IV
INF/START
THE ISSUES OF INF/START
The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) arms control
negotiations were born out of SALT.
chapter in US/Soviet arms control.

But they marked a new
For the most part, both

the INF and START talks were conditioned by a pre-set
deadline.

The 1979 NATO "dual track" decision had dictated

the end of 1983 as the date to begin deployment of Pershing
and cruise missiles in Western Europe. 1

From the outset the

INF component of the negotiations took priority, with the
success of START relying on positive results in INF.

START,

as it now appears, never had a chance as it succumbed to the
same fate as INF in 1983.
Unlike SALT, theater nuclear forces and strategic
forces were divided into separate forums.

Though this arms

control regime is largely associated with the Reagan
administration, the INF talks actually began just prior to
Reagan's election in 1980.

The fundamental issues on which

those talks would be based were actually a product of what
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SALT succeeded or failed to do.

The START negotiations, on

the other hand, did not begin until the summer of 1982.
INF
The first round of INF took place in Geneva and was
primarily an introductory meeting.

The Soviets, for the

most part, came to listen while the United States presented
guidelines based on the Integrated Defense Document (IDD), a
NATO communique issued in December 1979. 2

The primary task

of the U.S. delegation was not so much to deal with those
gray area weapons that had been so difficult in SALT, but to
respond to the recent deployments of Soviet intermediaterange missiles.
The Soviet position, once those missiles were
installed, was that a balance had been achieved in theater
nuclear forces.

The U.S. position, however, saw INF as the

necessary forum in which to redress the imbalance caused by
the Soviet deployments.

In the first round of talks,

therefore, the United States was already looking to at least
a partial deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe.
The purpose of the negotiation side of the "dual
track" decision was to compliment partial deployment of
Pershing II and cruise missiles by offering a reduction in
the number of missiles deployed in exchange for a reduction
in the number of Soviet SS-20s.

What this meant was that

the United States was treating the December 1983 deadline
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for deployment as if the missiles were already in place.
The bargaining chip was the promise, or threat, to deploy
new missiles rather than to remove existing weapons.
Ideally, of course, it was hoped that negotiations would
preclude new deployments in Western Europe.
idea behind the IDD decision.

This was the

Although an anti-arms control

attitude characterized the Reagan administration, a
commitment was made to the "dual track" decision soon after
Reagan took office. 3
The Reagan administration, however, did not actually
begin formal negotiations on INF until late 1981.

During an

NSC meeting on 12 November the decision was made to base the
U.S. negotiating position on the lowest possible equal
ceilings in intermediate-range weapons, preferably zero. 4
On November 18th President Reagan officially announced the
"zero option" in a National Press Club

speech.~

The

projected deployment of NATO missiles would be cancelled in
exchange for the dismantling of all Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s,
and SS-5s.
The Soviet position, however, was quite different.
Since they claimed that a balance existed since 1979, any
reduction or limitation of forces must include weapons
already deployed, namely British and French forces, and U.S.
forward-based systems in Europe.

The Soviets also called

for a complete moratorium on intermediate-range missile
deployments until a treaty could be concluded.

Total ''zero"
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for the Soviet Union was possible as long as it meant moving
closer to making Europe a nuclear free zone.

And, if not a

complete removal of nuclear forces, then a limit should be
placed on all those weapons over one thousand kilometers in
range.

Such a limit was not without significance, as it

would most have affected U.S. forward-based systems and U.S.
forces outside Europe but part of NATO defense.
Both the U.S. and the Soviet positions were far from
any common grounds for agreement.

The problem was that both

sides had totally different ideas of the military balance in
Europe, and that they adhered to different measurements of
that balance. 6

The Soviets insisted on counting British and

French systems while disregarding East bloc systems outside
Europe (i.e., weapons in European Russia).

The United

States disregarded British and French systems and counted
all Soviet systems in Eastern Europe.
The Soviets counted U.S. aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean and the North Atlantic when considering the
potential range of aircraft.

Yet they disregarded their own

Badger, Blinder, and Backfire bombers stationed outside
European Russia, but having the capability to strike Western
Europe.

The Soviets also chose to count Launchers rather

than warheads, disregarding the three warhead capability,
and the mobility of the SS-20.

The launcher's reloading

capability also gave the SS-20 a second-strike potential,
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another qualitative factor not surprisingly missing from
their count.
Not surprisingly too was the Soviet goal to prevent
the planned NATO deployment.

In Geneva for the second round

of talks (the first under the Reagan administration), U.S.
delegation leader Paul Nitze laid out the rationale for the
zero option, but provided no real details of a treaty.

The

Soviet team came to reiterate Brezhnev's proposal, a four
point plan which included an immediate moratorium on mediumrange (l,000-5,500 km.) weapons in Europe, negotiations
toward reductions in those weapons, eventual reduction to
zero of all medium-range weapons, and eventual reduction to
zero of all short-range and tactical nuclear weapons.
Included in this plan was a document on how this proposal
was to be implemented.

European forces (Including the

British and French) only would be counted.

The United

States, on the other hand, called for global ceilings,
covering Soviet missiles in Asia that could be re-deployed
if need be in Western Russia, or vice versa.

With very

little to agree on, negotiations were recessed in time for
Christmas.
Returning to Geneva in February 1982, the U.S. team
presented a draft treaty based on the zero option.

Nitze's

counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, tabled a document entitled
"Statement of Intentions,'' the essence of which stated that
the negotiations should produce an agreement that would
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follow the Soviet version of the zero option--zero Pershing
II and cruise missiles.

It also reiterated their

willingness to reduce to zero, matching only British and
French systems.

Each side rejected the other's proposals.

The fourth round of talks began in May 1982 with
neither side moving from their previous positions.

The

Soviets presented a draft treaty of their own, although it
merely added a few details to their Statement of Intentions
proposal.

They did indicate some flexibility on including

SS-20s deployed east of the Urals in a treaty.

The

inclusion of these missiles, however, had to be precluded by
a moratorium on further deployments, the key requirement of
the Soviet position.

This brought the negotiations back to

the main obstacle, the deployment of Pershing and cruise
missiles in Europe.

By the summer of 1982, therefore, the

talks had reached an impasse.
At the negotiating table the Soviets had been hinting
for some time that they would pull out of the talks if the
United States proceeded with the 1983 deployment schedule.
They had also hinted at possible counter-measures such as
new deployments of their own.

Indeed, early in 1984 such

counter-measures were reported. 7
Acting on his own, and motivated by political
pressures to break the impasse and reach an agreement before
the deployment date, chief U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze
attempted a compromise solution. 8

During the summer of 1982
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he decided to discuss such a solution one on one with his
counterpart, Kvitsinsky.

The proposed solution, the "walk

in the woods," as it came to be called, was an agreed-upon
compromise which each ambassador would present to their
respective governments.

Calling it a "joint exploratory

package," such an agreement would have compromised several
key issues.
The Soviets would have allowed new U.S. weapons in
Europe.

The Pershings would not be deployed but cruise

missiles would be acceptable.

The Soviets would also give

up their insistence for compensation if British and French
forces were not included, as had been their position in
SALT.

Soviet plans for their own cruise missiles would also

be scrapped.

The United States would sacrifice deployment

of the Pershing II (The Soviets were more adamant about
preventing deployment of the cruise).

A freeze on Soviet

SS-20s east of the Urals would also lend assurance to Japan,
Korea, and China, that their own security wasn't being
sacrificed by an INF treaty.
The "walk in the woods" solution would have meant a
major breakthrough in INF so long as both governments saw
fit to pursue it.

Unfortunately, it was rejected by both

governments and instead became a major political propaganda
issue.

The unofficial agreement to the plan was

subsequently denied by Kvitsinsky.

According to him,

Nitze's claim that the proposal was an "agreed-upon" deal,
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was aimed only to demonstrate some progress in the
negotiations. 9

Nitze, on the other hand, claimed that the

proposal was based on Soviet willingness to drop the
question of including British and french forces.

According

to Nitze, the Soviets wanted to make it appear that all the
initiative for the proposal came from Nitze alone, and then
was rejected by the Reagan administration.

Accordingly, the

Soviets were attempting to show West European governments
that breakdown in negotiations was the fault of U.S.
inflexibility.to
Although the talks resumed in Geneva in the fall of
1982, continuing through 1983, nothing was accomplished.
Both sides were adamant in their positions.

Even where

there was slight movement, the goals remained the same.

It

became clear that the Reagan administration was not willing
to abandon any part of the scheduled deployment, whereas the
Soviets were not about to sanction any deployment
whatsoever.

Following the death of Brezhnev, his successor,

Yuri Andropov, merely reiterated the Soviet position.

He

offered to match British and French forces with reductions
of Soviet medium-range missiles.

The United States,

however, would have to abandon its NATO deployments. 11
The United States, for its part, arrived at what was
known as the ''Interim Solution."

Until an understanding

could be reached as to how to achieve a reduction to zero,
the present balance must be redressed by moving ahead with
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new deployments.

The actual number of missiles to be

deployed, however, was claimed to be still negotiable.
In reality, this "solution" marked a major step away
from the "dual track" decision which sought to preclude new
missile deployments with arms control.

Now, the

administration was putting deployment ahead of any
reductions.

The "solution" also demonstrated the

administration's expectations that the Soviets would
continue negotiating once deployments began, or that a
Soviet walkout would justify deployments.

This zero-plus

proposal, not surprisingly, was quickly rejected by the
Soviet Union.
As the date for the delivery of the first Pershings
drew nearer, negotiations reached a breaking point.

The

crisis over the downing of a South Korean airliner on 2
September 1983 merely added to the already frustrated
relations between the two countries.

On 28 September 1983

Andropov expressed Soviet frustration with the arms talks
and the pointlessness of their continuation. 12

On November

23rd, as the first Pershings arrived in West Germany, the
Soviet delegation broke off negotiations.

No date was set

for their resumption.
START
The negotiations of START, like INF, were part of a
U.S. solution to redress a perceived imbalance; in theater
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weapons, brought about by the buildup of Soviet SS-20s
during the 1970s and, in strategic forces by the deployment
of new Soviet ICBMs, in particular, the SS-18, a tenwarhead, landbased, "monster MIRV."

And, as in INF, both

sides' positions stemmed from the same basic assumptions.
According to prevailing U.S. policy, SALT II had sanctioned
an imbalance in nuclear forces in favor of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet position, as stated by Gromyko, was that, "we
proceed from the assumption that everything was balanced out
in the SALT II treaty." 13

Consequently, the goals of both

sides in INF paralleled those in START.

The United States

sought deployment of new weapons systems in exchange for a
reduction or limitation on existing Soviet systems.

The

fate of START was linked to that of INF as well since the
Soviet goal in START was to prevent new American
deployments, strategic or theater.

Indeed, the Soviets had

made it clear that a START treaty must be precluded by the
cancellation of Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles.
The long-awaited airing of Reagan's START proposal
came on 9 May 1982 in a speech at Eureka College.1 4

Reagan

spoke in vague, general terms about the proposal, the main
essence of which was to achieve reductions in Soviet
missiles, most importantly the Soviet "heavy" SS-18.

The

United States, for its part, would pursue a modernization of
its own forces; the MX, B-1 and Stealth Bombers, cruise
missiles, and Trident II.

The Soviet Union was quick to
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reject the proposal, ired by the fact that Reagan was
focusing limitations on Soviet land-based missiles, the
backbone of their strategic forces.

The United States, they

claimed, had in effect agreed to leave those missiles alone
at Vladivostok in 1974.

They also claimed that the United

States was unwilling to sacrifice new weapons systems, such
as the MX, in exchange for Soviet reductions.
Shortly after the Eureka speech, Brezhnev answered
with his own proposal; a freeze on the production, testing,
and deployment of both sides' strategic systems.

This

proposal would have not only frozen the quantity of the
Soviet missiles that Reagan wanted reduced, but would have
also blocked the United States from any further development
of the Stealth, MX, Trident II, and cruise missiles.
By autumn 1982 when START negotiators finally met in
Geneva, both sides' positions were firmly set, and far
apart.

The Soviet team elaborated on Brezhnev's freeze

proposal.

They also reiterated Gromyko's warning in June

1982, that if the United States continued to pursue the
issue of Soviet "heavies," the Soviet Union would be forced
to reconsider the issue of American forward-based systems in
Europe.

1

~

Gromyko's warning was transformed into a proposal

by the Soviet delegation in Geneva.

Called the "reduction

proposal," its main feature was a lower SALT II ceiling on
total delivery vehicles (from 2250 to 1800) in exchange for
a U.S. guarantee of no additional deployments of FBS.

Thus,
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from the outset, START was inextricably linked with INF.
The Soviets were making it perfectly clear that no progress
in strategic arms reduction was possible as long as the
United States proceeded with additional INF deployments.
Also included in the "reduction proposal" was a new
ban on all long-range cruise missiles.

The SALT II

Protocol, which had banned long-range sea and groundlaunched cruise missiles (SLCMs and GLCMs), but allowed airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs}, had since expired.

The

United States was thus being asked to scrap its ALCM
program.
Equally unacceptable to the Soviets was an American
proposal designed specifically to reduce the number of
Soviet "heavies," and the total number of land-based
missiles in general.
reduction.

The proposal called for a two-phase

The first phase limited the total number of

ballistic warheads, with a subceiling on those based on
land.

The second phase established a low limit on ballistic

throw-weight.

Another U.S. proposal called for an

''inventory limit" on undeveloped ICBMs.

Whereas such a

limit would deter only Soviet attempts to stockpile large
numbers of extra ICBMs, it necessitated a verification
arrangement to include on-site inspection of production and
storage facilities, not to mention launch sites.

The

Soviets, though they agreed on the need for more stringent
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verification, were unwilling to accept such comprehensive
verification measures.
By 1983 very little progress had been made in Geneva.
The Soviets remained adamant in their position against the
scheduled deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, and
against allowing new U.S. strategic programs to proceed at
the expense of their present missile systems.

Meanwhile,

the Reagan administration was trying to steer a course of
strategic buildup through domestic pressures for a nuclear
freeze.

16

In March 1983 Reagan approached the nation, and the
Soviets, with a proposal to develop a new strategy and
technology based on defense weapons systems, one that would,
II

. give us the means of rendering .

impotent and obsolete." 17

.

. nuclear weapons

Beside raising questions

regarding the validity of strategic deterrence based on
mutual assured destruction (MAD), the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) was immediately assailed by the Soviet
Union for perpetuating a new arms race and abandoning the
1972 ABM Treaty.is
In part, to assuage Congress and the arms control
lobby in Washington, and in order to avert cancellation of
the MX, the Reagan administration in the fall of 1983,
incorporated its "build-down" theory into START
negotiations; a plan to retire older weapons at a faster
pace than they are replaced. 19
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With the additional proposal of "build-down" on the
negotiating table, coupled with Reagan's newly proposed SDI
program, the Soviets were likely confused by the
administration's arms control policy.

Was the "build-down"

supposed to replace the previous U.S. position in START?
How would SDI affect START negotiations?

To the Soviets,

the "build-down" concept left the U.S. position in START as
"vague, obscure, and unclear.

0

20

The added confusion in START, however, seemed to
matter very little by that time.

START was already dead as

the first Pershing !Is were delivered to West Germany.

On 8

December 1983, two weeks after the INF talks were cancelled,
the Soviets walked out of the strategic arms talks without a
resumption date.
THE POLITICAL LEADER CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE
The Reagan Administration
If hopes for the success of arms control as a viable
foreign policy tool were diminished in late 1979 when
President Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty from further
Senate consideration, those hopes were further dashed by the
election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980.

All

aspects of the new administration signaled an impending
demotion of arms control in U.S. foreign policy and the
promotion of an all-out effort to restore the military, and
political superiority of a past era.
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In the military realm, this effort was based on the
new administration's perspective that the nuclear balance
had shifted decisively in favor of the Soviet Union.
Blaming the "negotiability" of arms control, SALT in
particular, Reagan embarked on a massive re-arming
program. 2 1

Such a program was also seen as the key to

restoring political unity to NATO.

Western Europe, as the

new administration assumed, would regain the confidence in
American leadership that it had lost during the Carter era.
Personal Attitudes
Within the domestic milieu of the Reagan
administration, the factors which contributed most to an
anti-arms control policy and, at least the initial success
in support of that policy, can be accredited to Ronald
Reagan himself, his strong conservative ideological views,
the extent to which his decisions were based on ideology
rather than thoughtful analysis, and his ability as a
communicator.
Backed by a seasoned career in public speaking, as
sportscaster, trade union activist, spokesman for General
Electric, actor, and finally as Governor of California,
Ronald Reagan took his conservative views on the campaign
trail as a candidate with an "attractive personality and
style as political performer.

11

22

Less government regulation

of the free market, decentralization of federal government,
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lower taxes, and a tougher Soviet policy were the mainstay
of his conservative platform.
Reagan's foreign policy was not surprising given his
earlier record as a candidate for President.

He campaigned

against SALT and detente in 1976 on the premise that the
Soviets were the only ones to benefit from it.

During the

1980 campaign he came out in favor of a naval blockade of
Cuba in order to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

He

also advocated the mining of Iranian ports in order to gain
the release of U.S. hostages.

Reagan's views, however,

should not be seen as representing a casual approach to the
use of force, as Barnet claims, as much as they should be
seen as reflecting the attitudes of a man whose style and
image was shaped by a "get tough" rhetoric, simplistic
ideals, and superficiality.2a
It appears that Ronald Reagan knew and cared little
about strategy and concerned himself strictly with
generalities.

He was a speechmaker, not a policymaker.

Greenstein notes, Reagan's strong suit was dealing with
general themes rather than the specifics of issues.
As a rhetorician who pref erred anecdote to analysis
he could be sold on policies or even political
strategies without exploring their implications. 24
Participation
In matters of arms control, Reagan displayed no
realistic comprehension of the issues.

His knowledge and

As
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participation merely reinforced the ideological extreme and
simplicity of his world view.

As Talbott notes, during pre-

zero option NSC meetings, Reagan's attention would be lost
as he began to doodle.

"It was common .

during long

meetings on subjects about which he was less than passionate
"2 :5

Examples of Reagan's participation in decisionmaking
in arms control are numerous.

Talbott reveals how, through

long and highly technical debates over INF and START, Reagan
formulated his own simplistic ideas.
Cruise missiles were 'good' because they were, by
their nature, confined to retaliatory, second-strike
missions; ballistic missiles were 'bad' because they
were capable of preemptive, aggressive, first-strike
missions.2 6
The "walk in the woods" proposal, which allowed the
Soviets to retain a lesser number of ballistic missiles,
countered only by U.S. cruise missiles was, on the other
hand, rejected by Reagan.

In his mind, the United States

would have to rely on "slow-flyers" (cruise missiles) in
order to counter the Soviet "fast-flyers" (SS-20s)

.2 1

In an interview with Time Magazine in October 1983
Reagan acknowledged that as recently as 1982 he did not
realize that the bulk of Soviet nuclear forces were made up
of large land-based missiles.
ever brought that up before.2 8

Nobody, he explained, had
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Scope of Authority
Aside from Reagan's personal attitudes, the initial
success of his anti-arms control policy must also be
accredited to a wide scope of authority.

Reagan's election

victory, which included ninety percent of the electoral vote
(489 to 49) , 29 the first Republican control of the Senate
since 1954, and a thirty-three seat Republican gain in the
House, 30 provided Reagan with a perceived, if not real
mandate for his policies.
Whether Reagan's conservative ideology was any
indication of the popular attitude that voted him into
office, it was his fine-tuned ability to communicate and
influence, coupled with surrounding himself with other
staunch conservatives, that ensured that his policies would
prevail over more moderate voices from within both political
parties.

Although the Reagan administrative style could be

called more of a cabinet government, given the President's
reliance on his advisors for policy specifics and
implementation, Reagan always reserved the final word on
major issues for himself, which he then made public via
emotional speeches or aggrandized press conferences.

Though

his decisions were of ten based on his own ideological
outlook and simplistic views, his authority was generally
undisputed.

Whereas the same can hold true of any

administration, it is a credit to Reagan's strong
personality that advisors often were inclined to "tailor
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their recommendations to fit his presumed views and
biases.

n31

There is no question that the political leadership
characteristics of the Reagan administration were a major
contributor to the impasse in INF and START.

From the

outset, the U.S. position was one designed primarily to cast
the image of serious negotiating while moving forward with
the re-arming programs that Reagan had espoused.

The basis

of the zero option was more than an intentionally
unacceptable proposal.

It was part and parcel of the anti-

soviet, anti-communist ideology that characterized the
Reagan administration.

If the NATO "dual track'' decision

was partly designed to re-establish whatever momentum in
arms control that SALT had once achieved, it most surely,
too, became the ideal vehicle for the Reagan administration
to achieve new missile deployments in Western Europe.
Transition in Soviet Leadership
Soviet behavior in INF and START was beset by internal
problems, both economic and political.

Expectations of

improved economic performance were not realized.

The

national income annual growth rate was about 3 percent in
1982 as compared to over 9 percent in 1964. 32

Industrial

production fell from 7.3 percent in 1964 to 2.9 percent in
1982. 33

In addition, poor agricultural harvests in 1979 and

1980, labor shortages, and increased competition for
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resource allocation between heavy and light industry put
further demands on the leadership for reforms.

Furthermore,

the failure of Brezhnev's detente policy to expand trade and
credit with the West, compounded the severity of the
economic situation.
The failure of Brezhnev's economic and detente
policies, the success of which was the mainstay of
Brezhnev's leadership credibility, created a wider division
among the top leadership over policy direction.

As the

Strodes note, the domestic coalition that had supported
detente in 1970, dichotomized by "unilateralists'' and
"diplomatists," was now split by the failure of detente.3 4
That coalition was further weakened by the issue of
leadership succession.

Brezhnev's sustained poor health and

increasing inability to perform in an official capacity
prompted competition and political positioning within the
Party ranks.

The Soviet leadership, faced with the

demanding problems of the economy and detente, was further
detained from rebuilding any policy consensus by the ensuing
struggle for succession.

As the Strodes concede, however,

leaders vying for position, " . . . may adopt positions for
purely tactical

reasons," 3 ~

Since the distinction between

differing policy perspectives becomes "blurred" during
periods of succession, the use of dichotomies in the
analysis of Soviet politics may not be appropriate.3 6
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Soviet Policy in INF/START
Soviet policy during the early 1980s, therefore, may
be considered a transitional period, marked by uncertainty,
confusion, and an uncompromising, wait and see attitude in
arms control.

As Redlin has observed, a climate of

succession politics, marked by "contention" and "stalemate,"
is not conducive to new initiatives in Soviet national
security policy. 3 7

Thus, he explains, this period of arms

control was one of "meager accomplishment" during Brezhnev's
last years, and of "continuity in substance and strategy"
with Brezhnev's policies during Andropov's term as General
Secretary. 3 a
Whereas some observers of Soviet politics may be more
willing to credit Andropov with a new aggressiveness in
foreign policy, citing, for example, his "peace offensive"
in Western Europe, 39 events and actions indicate a growing
reluctance by Brezhnev and Andropov to defend the priority
of arms control as they had done in the 1970s.

In an

October 1982 speech Brezhnev made no mention of INF and
START but called for top priority in military funding.

40

Speeches by other Politburo members also displayed a
negative view toward arms control. 4 1

Furthermore, although

Andropov has been characterized as "pro-detente," 42
criticisms were voiced regarding the emphasis of cooperative
diplomacy in Soviet security policy. 4 3
Short of a complete reversal in policy, however, the
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tendency toward the "unilateralist'' approach might be viewed
more as a reassertion of the more traditional Soviet view of
peaceful coexistence, with its explicit call for continued
conflict between socialism and capitalism.

In this view,

Soviet policy did not give way to the views of a competing
faction, but was merely a reaffirmation of the long-term
socialist goals adhered to by all Party leaders.

Detente,

not unlike peaceful coexistence, was meant to constrain the
West, not the Soviet Union.

If it fails to do so, Soviet

socialism must prevail by other, unilateral means.
Soviet arms control proposals, the goals of which were
to block NATO missile deployments and American strategic
arms programs, were designed to retain the favorable
correlation of forces achieved in the 1970s.

But they also

marked a change in the means to achieve these goals.

Rather

than constraining Western military buildup through treaty
compromises and luring the West into a sense of relaxed
tension, Andropov sought to unilaterally move ahead with his
own military buildup while rhetorically influencing public
opinion in the West with the idea that it was the United
States that was not serious about arms control.
Insofar as Soviet perceptions of the Reagan
administration were correct, Soviet policy must also be seen
as reacting to U.S. policy.

The Soviet walkout of INF in

December 1983 demonstrated their frustration in negotiating
with the Reagan administration.

Beyond this, the walkout
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may also be seen as an indication that, within the top
leadership, a reaffirmation of policy consensus had already
emerged which in turn provided the political conditions
allowing Andropov to drop arms control altogether.
Nevertheless, the succession issue, which remained at
the forefront of Soviet politics due to Andropov's own
declining health and lasting through the transitional period
of Chernenko, sustained an unstable power arrangement in the
Kremlin, thereby constraining whatever initiatives Soviet
leaders may have wished to advance.4 4
The fate of INF and START, therefore, was doomed as
both the Soviet and American political leader
characteristics proved unfavorable to arms control.
THE SUBSYSTEM VARIABLES
Of any arms control regime thus far, perhaps INF/Start
demonstrates the best case of subsystem influence on U.S.
foreign policy.

Arguments that hold the Reagan

administration's confrontational and unilateral style of
foreign policy responsible for the impasse in arms control
negotiations are only valid to the extent that foreign
policy failed to recognize and accommodate the constraints
of the subsystem.

The Reagan "challenge" to restore

American power through military, political, and economic
domination rather than accommodation went a long way in
aggravating adversary and alliance relations alike.

But it
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did not fundamentally alter them.

On the contrary, it was

Reagan's policies that were forced to adapt as his attempt
to control the environment was challenged by recent changes
within the subsystem itself.

As Kenneth Oye has keenly

observed, "Ironically, the evolution of Reagan
administration foreign policy may appear, in retrospect, as
a textbook example of how the international environment
shapes foreign

policy." 4 ~

Changed Security Perceptions
The events and outcome of INF/START must therefore be
linked to the transformation of the subsystem relationships.
Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
reached a new low as the 1980s began (see Appendix Table XV
and Figure 2).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the

developing crisis in Poland, and new missile deployments,
all but completely dismantled the detente established a
decade earlier.
Relations between the United States and Western Europe
also worsened as West European security concerns intensified
(see Appendix Table XV).

At one extreme allied fears were

raised by a US/Soviet agreement (SALT II) which in their
view had been made at the expense of European security.

At

the other extreme they feared the breakdown of detente and a
return to cold war relations between the superpowers.

121
The allies wanted reassurance from the United States
that it would not allow the American nuclear deterrent to
become decoupled from European deterrence.

At the same time

they sought reassurance from the United States that serious
efforts to promote better East/West relations would not be
lost to a renewed, sustained arms race.

Alarmed by

President Carter's about-face on his decision to provide
allied countries with the neutron bomb, West European
governments called upon the United States to deploy new
missiles for NATO's deterrent.

At the same time they called

for new arms control negotiations as a way to promote a
return to detente and hopefully to preclude new missile
deployments.
This was the essence of the 1979 NATO Integrated
Decision Document (IDD), otherwise known as the ''dual track"
decision.

The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles

was scheduled to begin in December 1983 unless arms control
negotiations were successful in averting it.
Caught between the need to check the deployment of a
new generation of Soviet theater missiles (SS-20s) and the
need to sustain an atmosphere of favorable East/West
relations, West European governments walked a fine political
line between detente and deterrence.

Consequently, West

European/Soviet relations in the latter 1970s maintained a
precariously balanced relationship as the US/Soviet detente
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faltered (see Appendix Tables X-XIII), then worsened as
US/Soviet relations chilled during the early 1980s (see
Appendix Table XIV) .
Domestic pressures mounted as the fate of West
European governments rested on the question of European
security.

Opposition parties in Britain, West Germany,

Italy, and the intransigence of Belgium and the Netherlands,
all scheduled to receive a share of the missile
deployments, 46 threatened the survival of their pro-NATO
governments.

In order to strengthen themselves, and NATO,

pressure had to be put on the United States and the Soviet
Union to negotiate an agreement that reduced the risk of war
in Europe.
U.S. and Soviet Reaction
In order to strengthen NATO unity it was necessary for
the United States to focus on the needs of its allies.

And,

in order to divide the alliance, the Soviet Union would have
to attempt to sway European public opinion, playing the
Atlantic partners off one another by showing a willingness
to negotiate.

Consequently, the direction that US/Soviet

relations would take, and that INF/START would follow, was
largely dependent upon the political decisions of West
European governments and the degree to which the two
superpowers could elicit West European support for their own
policy goals.

To be sure, in INF/START Western Europe
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clearly had become a negotiating party without formal
negotiating status.

The "dual track" decision had

set the scene for a situation in which the Europeans
could more easily push the U.S. around--and the
Soviet Union could more easily push the Europeans
around. 47
Having committed to the NATO dual track decision, the
United States had made the deployment of a nuclear weapons
program "dependent on prior allied consent" and a commitment
to arms control a pre-condition to deployment. 4 8

For

President Reagan, with his antipathy toward arms control,
the decision to back away from the 1979 decision would have
been seen as a severe breach of faith between alliance
partners, something for which he had criticized Jimmy
Carter.

It also would have given the Soviet Union, at no

cost to them, a clear political victory over the West.

For

its own part, the United States would have to hold its
allies to the deployment track while they, in turn, would
have to hold the Reagan administration to arms control
negotiations.
On the other hand, the "dual track" decision provided
the Soviet Union with the unique opportunity to gain "a
Soviet veto over any kind of deployment and the first step
toward

. neutralization" of Western Europe. 49

In the

same vein, as Talbott asserts,
If the Soviets played the allies off against each
other, fanned the hopes and fears of the West
European peace movement, and exploited transatlantic
tensions skillfully, they stood to win a double

124
prize, a halt to a threatening military program, and new
political discord within NAT0.~ 0
Both sides, therefore, were sufficiently motivated to
participate in arms control negotiations, but not within the
framework of SALT.

The Reagan administration had been

opposed to the treaty on the claim that it froze the nuclear
balance in favor of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, too, had

reason not to insist on a SALT framework.

SALT II had been

facilitated by agreeing not to include the American forwardbased systems as well as British and French systems.

If the

Soviets were to successfully block the deployment of
Pershing II and cruise missiles, SALT II, for obvious
reasons, could not be allowed to establish such a precedent
for any new treaty.
The formal opening of INF negotiations did not take
place until November 1981, one year after Reagan was elected
President.

The delay is certainly no surprise given the

anti-arms control bias of his campaign.

Reagan did,

however, commit to arms control on the basis of the "dual
track" decision in April 1981.

Only after West European

prodding and Soviet criticism did Reagan finally agree to
begin discussions in Geneva.
The interim, though, was not wasted time as both sides
began maneuvering for political position.

Aimed both at

building domestic support for defense programs and allied
support for the scheduled missile deployments, Reagan sought
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to promote the Soviet Union as the root of all evil in the
world.

He vowed that by regaining superiority the West

would transcend and dismiss communism as a "sad, bizarre
chapter in human

history."~

1

He renewed criticism of Soviet

troops in Afghanistan warning that any military action on
their part against Poland would have "the gravest
consequences."~2

The Soviet Union, in the meantime, launched an all out
peace campaign directed primarily at Western Europe in order
to portray themselves as a peace-loving nation willing to
compromise in the spirit of

detente.~

3

In keeping with that

line, Brezhnev initiated a proposal to begin discussions for
reducing tensions between the superpowers.
West European Reaction
Alliance relations had further deteriorated by
November.

At a time when West European governments were

trying to calm rising waves of public protest against higher
defense spending and more nuclear weapons on their soil, the
United States was pushing them to increase their individual
contributions toward NATO defense.

Secretary of Defense

Weinberger told West Europeans, "The American people may not
wish to bear the burden of necessary defense expenditures if
they think some are doing less as we do

more."~

4

During

October and November demonstrations of over one million
peace marchers gathered in West European capitals, including
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250,000 protesters in Bonn,ee and 300,000 in Brussels. 06
Over three million marchers were expected to take part in
planned demonstrations during "action week" in October.e 7
The European peace movement turned more anti-American
than anti-Soviet, particularly following a remark by
President Reagan that he "could see where you could have an
exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field
without it bringing either one of the major powers to
pushing the button.••ea

West Europeans were outraged by the

President's admission of a contingency plan for limited
nuclear war in Europe, but it seemed to attest to all their
suspicions about Ronald Reagan.

All the Soviet Union had to

do was to sit back and empathize with European frustration.
West European public opinion appeared to be on the Soviets'
side.
The Issue of Deployment
From the beginning to end, INF/START was a forum, not
for achieving real arms limitations or reductions, but for
advancing political objectives.

There were some within the

Reagan administration who did not advocate earnest
negotiations toward real arms reductions.

But, it seems, to

achieve real arms control in the early 1980s was, at best,
wishful thinking.

Spurgeon Keeny, who was deputy director

at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) at the
time of the "dual track" decision, admits that the
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commitment to arms control was solely to promote new missile
deployments rather than real missile reductions:
most people . . . looked on this as a political
necessity to get NATO acceptance of the deployment,
rather than something where the arms control process
had a serious chance of success.~ 9
Deployment was the real issue.

Since neither the

Pershing II nor the cruise missile would be ready for
deployment until December 1983, INF/START would be
guaranteed a life span of at least two years, unless of
course the United States were to renege on its commitment to
deployment, or the Soviet Union either gave up its attempt
to prevent deployment or agreed to reduce the number of its
SS-20s.

The Soviets, though, had little incentive to

concede their position since they had two years in which to
persuade West Europeans that deployment was not in their
best interests.

The Soviets also were quite aware, as

Talbott explains, that the longer they "could get the West
Europeans to procrastinate, the less bargaining leverage the
U.S. would have in the negotiations."60
The next chapter in arms control promised to be little
more than an exchange of proposals, based not on their
negotiability, but intended for West European consumption.
While American negotiators hammered out the virtues of the
"zero option,'' their Soviet counterparts espoused Brezhnev's
moratorium on further deployments pending a treaty.

In

addition, they presented their own version of "zero" which
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meant establishing Europe as a nuclear free zone.

If total

zero was unacceptable to the United States, then, the
Soviets suggested, a four point plan designed to achieve
reductions in medium-range systems after a moratorium was in
effect, followed by the eventual elimination of all nuclear
weapons from Europe.
In order to promote his proposals and timed to take
advantage of public demonstrations, Brezhnev personally
travelled to Bonn in November 1981.

There he offered to

take the first step by unilaterally eliminating hundreds of
Soviet missiles. 6 1

The missiles he spoke of, however, were

the older SS-4s and SS-5s which the SS-20s were to replace
anyway.

Nevertheless, Brezhnev's proposal struck a popular

note among West Europeans.

And, although West European

governments continued to stand by the deployment decision,
the Soviet peace campaign made it difficult for allied
governments to maintain a consensus in favor of deployment.
Alliance Relations
The more West European governments were pressured, the
more that pressure was re-directed at the United States to
break the arms control impasse and find some formula for
compromise.

Such was the political backdrop leading to the

''walk in the woods" solution.

The significance of this

initiative was that, where it might have been used to dispel
West European concerns that no progress was being made
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toward an agreement, in fact it was not.
rejected the plan.

Both sides

The United States even wanted to

withhold the fact that a Nitze-Kvitsinsky arrangement ever
took place.

The Reagan administration feared that allied

consultation and the possibility of allied approval might
force the United States to adopt the plan as a basis for
agreement.
European suspicions were renewed that any attempt at
progress in arms control by the United States was taking a
back seat to nothing less than full deployment of the 572
Pershing and cruise missiles.

What should have been clear,

and perhaps it was, was that the U.S. commitment to
deployment, based on the alliance call for stronger NATO
leadership and solidarity, as defined by the 1979 NATO
decision, would essentially prevent any serious arms
agreement from being achieved.

This was also evident in one

of the administration's main arguments against a nuclear
freeze.
A freeze would cast serious doubt on American
leadership of the NATO alliance . . . . A freeze now,
would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the
United States to withdraw from this joint allied
undertaking.62
A continuation of arms control dialogue between the
United States and the Soviet Union, however, was also a
necessary part of that commitment to alliance solidarity, at
least until those governments, designated as recipients of
deployment, formally accepted the new missiles.

The Soviet
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Union, meanwhile, took the opportunity to woo Western Europe
away from deployment as strained alliance relations were
further tested.
Anti-nuclear demonstrations continued in Europe.

The

nuclear freeze movement in the United States gained
legislative sponsorship in Congress.
Alexander Haig resigned. 63

Secretary of State

Arguments were renewed

advocating a no first-use nuclear strategy for NAT0. 64

By

1981 US/West European relations were at the lowest point in
ten years (see Figure 2).

Serious damage to alliance

relations occurred in 1982 as the result of a controversy
involving East/West trade

policy.

6

~

The United States was

concerned that a decision by Britain, France, West Germany,
and Italy to sell equipment to the Soviet Union for the
construction of a pipeline to be used to supply gas to
Western Europe would dangerously increase their dependency
on the Soviet Union.
The allies did not share this view.

Only a small

fraction of their total energy needs would be provided by
the pipeline.

The crisis developed, however, when the

United States decided to invoke sanctions against American
companies and their European subsidiaries involved in the
pipeline deal.

The allies saw this action as an

infringement on their sovereignty and refused to reverse
their decision.

In order to prevent any permanent rift in
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the alliance, the Reagan administration was forced to call
off the sanctions only a few months later.
The significance of the pipeline controversy was much
more than a crisis in alliance solidarity.

It underscored

the basic differences between American and West European
security policy.

The United States sought to deter Soviet

aggression by isolating the Soviet Union.

The Europeans

argued for greater economic interdependence between East and
West.

The carrot and the stick approach to Soviet policy

divided alliance perceptions of security.

Western Europe

pressed the need for arms control while the United States
pressed for deployment.
Soviet Policy:

Last Chance to Divide NATO on Deployment

The Kremlin's strategy was to exploit these
differences.

Threats were made to walk out of arms control

negotiations and to deploy new nuclear weapons if the NATO
deployment proceeded.

In December 1982 Yuri Andropov

offered to reduce the number of medium-range missiles to
match those of the British and French forces. 66

In January

1983 the Soviets offered to negotiate a non-aggression pact
with NATO.
As the 1983 deployment date drew nearer it became more
doubtful that the Soviets would be able to prevent or even
delay deployment.

The upcoming West German elections in

March 1983 presented a last chance opportunity to turn the
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tide against deployment.

If West German public opinion

could be swayed enough in opposition, then perhaps Helmut
Kohl's government would have to rely on a coalition more
committed to arms control, or to some concessions on
deployment.
Kohl's party was victorious, and in the aftermath of
the election the United States did propose the "interim
solution" that qualified only partial deployment until an
agreement could be reached on a reduction to zero.

This

"zero plus" proposal was presented primarily to bolster
Kohl's new government, while preparing the way for the
arrival of the first shipment of Pershing IIs in West
Germany. 67
By fall 1983 the Soviets were dropping strong hints of
discontinuing INF negotiations. 68

The September Korean

airliner incident seriously damaged Western perceptions of
peaceful Soviet intentions. 6 9

Alliance relations

experienced a leveling off of tension in 1983 (see Figure
2).

As the first cruise missiles arrived in Britain in

December 1983, the Soviets walked out of INF and START
negotiations.
CONCLUSION
By 1980 US/Soviet relations had reached the lowest
level of cooperation thus far (see Figure 2).

From a

bilateral perspective, US/Soviet arms control negotiations

133

had very little chance of convening, let alone succeeding
with an arms control treaty.
The analysis of the Reagan administration concludes a
definite anti-arms control posture.

The analysis of the

transition and confusion in Soviet politics supports the
conclusion of minimal motivation for arms control
negotiations.

Since the two superpowers did enter into arms

control negotiations, the motivation can only be understood
by adding the subsystem perspective.
The trilateral political environment of INF/START had
been established by 1979.

It had been decided that cruise

and Pershing II missiles would be deployed in Western
Europe, but would be coupled with arms control efforts.
NATO's "dual track" decision and the zero-option position of
the United States were not so much bargaining chip and
leveraging tactics to gain Soviet concessions as they were
reflections of NATO ambivalence in Western security policy.
In this view, the "dual track'' decision was at once designed
to calm West European fears of entrapment (in an atmosphere
of growing perceptions of US/Soviet confrontation) , and to
allay West European fears of abandonment (in response to
West European perceptions of an increasing Soviet military
threat) .
INF/START was, therefore, a forum in which U.S. and
Soviet arms control policy was largely set and played out
according to two relationships; US/West European and West
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European/Soviet.

INF and START negotiations thus proceeded

on the basis of U.S. policies that sought to promote
alliance unity and Soviet policies that sought to promote
alliance disunity.
US/West European relations did level off with American
reassurance that deployment would proceed, but the degree of
unity remained low as negotiations stagnated toward a treaty
that could preclude the deployment of cruise and Pershing
IIs (see Figure 2).

West European/Soviet relations bettered

somewhat by 1983 (see Figure 2) due to some success by the
Soviet Union to opportunize on West European entrapment
concerns.
The motivation to negotiate INF/START, however, was
lost as the deployment half of the ''dual track" decision
became a reality.

The Soviets cancelled all arms talks in

December 1983 and US/Soviet relations took a sharp turn
downward (see Figure 2).

US/Soviet relations and US/Soviet

arms control were, therefore, most significantly the result
of the subsystem environment in which the assumed behavior
of the alliance/adversary model were played out.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
RESEARCH SUMMARY
By examining West European/US subsystem variables, in
addition to domestic and bilateral processes, this study has
demonstrated that US/Soviet arms control, including the
motivation to negotiate, negotiating positions and the
result of negotiations, is significantly affected by these
subsystem relationships and is not entirely the outcome of a
bilateral process involving only domestic political factors.
Based on this study's analyses of SALT I, SALT II, and
INF/START, the trilateral relationship of the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Western Europe has had a definite
impact on US/Soviet arms control.
This study has also demonstrated that the behavior of
the United States and the Soviet Union toward arms control
(acting in accordance with the alliance/adversary model) has
been consistently associated with changes in West European
security perceptions and U.S. and Soviet reactions to those
changes.

Changes in these relationships have been largely

responsible for determining the political environment in
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which the fate of US/Soviet arms control has been played
out.

It is likely they will do so in the future.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study points up several policy considerations

necessary in understanding current arms control
negotiations.
First, policymakers must consider the idea that
subsystem influence on arms control may remain constant
while domestic political factors in U.S. and Soviet foreign
policymaking may vary.

As long as the behavior of each

actor toward the other remains consistent with their role as
alliance partner and/or adversary, changes in U.S. and
Soviet domestic political factors, such as the Political
Leader Characteristics Variable used in this study, cannot
entirely determine the fate of US/Soviet arms control.
Policymakers must not only recognize the existence of
subsystem influence (i.e., West European concerns of
abandonment or entrapment), they must also consider the
political implications of attempting to control that
influence.

This may be done either by continuing to manage

the existing subsystem relationships, or by changing or
eliminating the central features of those relationships-those of military alliance partners and adversaries.
As evidenced in this study, the management of alliance
relations has often hindered US/Soviet arms control by
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creating new security concerns.

United States reaction to

West European entrapment or abandonment concerns has
generally created further changes in West European security
perceptions, and subsequently, renewed U.S. reaction.
Such a "circular" pattern of relations does not seem
conducive to creating a more consistent positive environment
for arms control.

The right questions regarding more

favorable and stable conditions for arms control, therefore,
may well be ones which take to issue the nature of alliance
relations, including the dissolution of NAT0. 1

As Sharp has

argued, simply adjusting defense policies as part of
alliance management will likely lead to West European
perceptions of abandonment or entrapment, or both, "thereby
becoming part of the problem rather than the solution." 2
This dilemma of alliance management is also evidenced
in more recent arms control negotiations.

The Reykjavik

summit meeting in October 1986, produced great concerns of
abandonment in Western Europe as Reagan and Gorbachev spoke
of eliminating all nuclear weapons in Europe. 3

The signing

of the INF Treaty in December 1987 raised questions
regarding both entrapment (greater risk of conventional war
in Europe), and abandonment (a move toward European
denuclearization and American disengagement) . 4

Indeed, the

dilemma involving INF and alliance cohesion was responded to
with calls for modernizing conventional weapons in

Europe,~

conventional and short-range nuclear weapons negotiations,
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and calls for Western Europe to take greater responsibility
for its defense.6
A second consideration for present arms control
policymaking concerns keeping Soviet foreign policy in
historical perspective.

Similar to Brezhnev's detente

policy in SALT I, the success of Gorbachev's domestic
policies of perestroika and glasnost are linked to East/West
cooperation and a policy of dividing NATO politically rather
than militarily.

A trend toward an atmosphere of neo-

detente, coupled with a "tendency in the West to equate arms
control with peace," 7 helps strengthen Gorbachev's domestic
position as well as relaxing alliance purpose.

U.S.

policymakers must be cautious of Gorbachev's motives as well
as sensitive to West European concerns.

West European

budgetary concerns and the problem for West European
governments in maintaining fragile coalitions with
opposition parties require Western Europe to adopt better
relations with the Soviet Union.
Grand proposals in arms control, such as Gorbachev's
recent offers to unilaterally reduce the Soviet military by
500,000 men and 10,000 tanks over the next two years, 8 and
the removal of nuclear missiles and other arms under the
control of 50,000 troops to be pulled out of Eastern
Europe,9 must be viewed suspiciously as renewed efforts
toward the political intimidation of Western Europe.

Once

again, alliance relations may be tested as the United States
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faces the issues of allowing closer West European/Soviet
ties, negotiating further arms control, and shoring up

alliance cohesion with arms modernization.
FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
This year marks a new chapter in arms control.

INF is

behind us now, and the success of START and the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE) negotiations will be
influenced by the same variables that have affected past
arms control negotiations.

The Bush administration is faced

with problems at home such as drugs, crime, the homeless,
and the national debt.

The theme of bipartisanship will be

a key factor in determining policy goals and priorities.to
Arms control will play a central role in this domestic
political atmosphere as the realities of "executivecongressional engagement" are played out.
Gorbachev will likely deal with Bush from a stronger
domestic position, though he may come under greater internal
pressure to show positive results from his reforms.

Unlike

Brezhnev, however, Gorbachev's reforms have been radical and
far reaching, and their effects may take several years to
filter through the system.

The Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan, and proposals to cut back the military,
combined with the effects of internal restructuring and a
more open society, will surely test Soviet power at home and
abroad.

If Soviet reforms are the reaction to the USSR in
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decline, 11 then Gorbachev may likely continue the current
trend in policies.

The West must be aware, however, that

based on past actions, Soviet policies of cooperation can be
deceiving.
Another consideration for arms control policymaking is
that Western Europe will likely continue to become a more
influential political and economic power.

Further steps

will likely be made toward West European integration. 12
Western Europe will have greater influence on questions
regarding its own security.

US/Soviet arms control

negotiations involving conventional weapons in Europe will
involve a more direct decisionmaking responsibility for West
European governments.

The military capabilities of European

NATO nations will not be as easily ignored as they were in
SALT and INF.
If the central features of the subsystem relationships
are left unchanged, what we may likely see is a continuation
of the cyclical pattern of relations that has governed arms
control thus far.

If this is the case, then we are entering

a positive environment for arms control.

Western Europe and

the Soviet Union need closer ties with one another for
political as well as economical reasons.

Closer West

European/Soviet relations will rely on continued US/Soviet
cooperation.
If, however, the central features of the subsystem
relationships are changed, due to either the dissolution of
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NATO as we now know it, or the end of the US/Soviet
adversarial relationship, the 40th anniversary of NATO may
mark the end of an era, and the beginning of a totally new
arms control environment.
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CHAPTER V NOTES
tThis policy implication has recently been touched
upon, although not specifically as a response to the issue
of subsystem influence on arms control.
Several examples of
pro-alliance management can be found.
See, for example,
Michael R. Gordon, "INF: A Hollow Victory?" Foreign Policy
(No. 68, Fall 1987), and; Jonathan Dean, "Military Security
in Europe," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, No. l, Fall 1987).
For a pro-disengagement argument, see, for example,
Christopher Layne, ''Atlanticism without NATO," Foreign
Policy (No. 67, Summer 1987).
2 Jane M.O. Sharp, "Arms Control and Alliance
Commitments," Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 100, No. 4,
Winter 1985-86), p. 652.
3 Two noteworthy discussions of the Reykjavik summit
include, Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, "Reykjavik
and Beyond," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 65, No. 2, Winter 198687), and; James Schlesinger, "Reykjavik and Revelations: A
Turn of the Tide?" Foreign Affairs (Vol. 65, No. 3, 1986).

For a detailed discussion of West European reaction
to INF, see, for example, Lynn E. Davis, "Lessons of the INF
Treaty," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, No. 4, Spring 1988).
4

~see, for example, Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin,
Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66,
No. 4, Spring 1988), and, more recently; Melissa Healy,
"NATO Chief Offers Modernization Plan," The Oregonian
(August 11, 1988), p. All.

Bryan Brumley, "U.S. prods NATO allies to do more,"
The Oregonian (December 29, 1988), p. A9.
6

'Dimitri K. Simes, "Gorbachev: A Mew Foreign Policy?''
Foreign Affairs (Vol. 65, No. 3, 1986), p. 492.
BBill Keller, "Soviet tells U.N. he will make
'unilateral' troop reductions," The Oregonian (December 8,
1988), pp. Al, Al4.
9Carol J. Williams, "When Soviet troops leave, so will
their nuclear arms," The Oregonian (January 20, 1989), p.

AS.
1°The theme of bipartisanship was part of George
Bush's inaugural speech.
"And we need a new engagement,
too, between the executive and the Congress . . . A new
breeze is blowing--and the old bipartisanship must be made
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new again." Excerpts are from transcripts re-printed in The
Oregonian (January 21, 1989), p. A15.
The theme was also promoted in Henry Kissinger and
Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs (Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988).
11 Robert G.
Kaiser, "The U.S.S.R. in Decline," Foreign
Affairs (Vol. 67, No. 2, Winter 1988-89), p. 97.
1 2such efforts may include progress in the development
of an Anglo-French nuclear weapons system, formation of a
Franco-German military brigade; or have included, the
revival of the Western European Union (WEU), and the
formation of the Franco-German Council on Defense and
Security.
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TABLE I
SALT I SUBSYSTEM DATA

1969-MAY i972

Variable
US/USSR

.

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

148
99
71

47
31
22

positive
neutral
negative

52
52
20

42
42
16

positive
neutral
negative

89
20
32

63
14
23

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

ill

163

TABLE II
SUBSYSTEM DATA

1969
.

Variable
US/USSR

US/W. Europe

.IJ.

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

35
33
17

41
39

positive
neutral
negative

24
22

4J
39

10

18

positive
neutral
negative

29

60

8
11

17
23

20

Europe/USSR

Total Observations

182
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TABLE III
SUBSYSTEM DATA

1970
.

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

21
17
28

32
26

positive
neutral
negative

4

positive
neutral
negative

15

Variable
US/USSR

US/~v.

Europe

9
4

42

23.5
53
23.5

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

4
2

104

71
19
10

165

TABLE IV
SUBSYSTEM DATA
1971
.
Variable
US/USSR

US///. Europe

:/J. Europe/USSR

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

58

59

27
1)

28

positive
neutral
negative

15
8
4

15

positive
neutral
negative

28
2
14

64
4
)2

Total Observations

169

1)

55

JO

166

TABLE V
SUBSYSTEM DATA
ll'HRU MAY 1972
.

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

34
22
13

49
32
19

positive
neutral
negative

9

1J
2

38
54
8

positive
neutral
negative

17
6
5

61
21
18

Variable
US/USSR

us/w.

Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

121

167

TABLE VI
SALT II SUBSYSTEM DATA

197)-1979
Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

229
185
146

41
33
26

positive
neutral
negative

133
138
69

39
41
20

positive
neutral
negative

94
50
57

47
25
28
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US/USSR

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

1101
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SUBSYSTEM DATA

1973
.
Observations

Percent
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neutral
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47
37
16

47
37
16
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19
27
17
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neutral
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30
7
9
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US/USSR

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

202

43
27

65
15
20
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SUBSYSTEM DATA
1974
.

Observations

Percent
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neutral
negative

73
43
20
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21
21
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19

Variable
US/USSR

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

8

5
7

21z

31.5
15
42
42
16
61
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23
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TABLE IX
SUBSYSTEM DATA
1975
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US/USSR
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neutral
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Percent

26
22

35

15

24
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20

34

23
16

39
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15

52

9

31
17

Total Observations

5
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41

27
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1976
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US/USSR
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Percent

positive
neutral
negative

17

31

22
15

41
28

positive
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14
14

42.5
42.5

5

15

positive
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5

28

6

33
39

Total Observations

7
105
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TABLE XI
SUBSYSTEM DATA

1977
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US/USSR
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w.
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Europe/USSR
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Percent
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neutral
negative

31
31
31

33.3
33.3
33.3

positive
neutral
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20
19
10

41
39
20

positive
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10

35.5

Total Observations

8

10
170

29

35.5
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TABLE XII
SUBSYSTEM DATA

1978

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

20
16
32

29
24
47

positive
neutral
negative

24
20

46
39
15

positive
neutral
negative

8
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US/USSR

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

8

9
8

145

32
36
32

174

TABLE XIII
SUBSYSTEM DATA

1979
·observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

15
14
17

33
30
37

positive
neutral
negative

15
14
5

44
41
15

positive
neutral
negative

7

29
25
46

Variable
US/USSR

US/w. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

6

11
104

175

TABLE XIV

INF/START SUBSYSTEM DATA
1980-1983

Variable
US/USSR

US/w. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Observations

Percent

18.3
31.3
50.3

positive
neutral
negative

55
94
151

positive
neutral
negative

66
92

47

32
45
23

positive
neutral
negative

24
45
54

19.5
36.5
44

Total Observations

/::.')R
628

176

TABLE XV
SUBSYSTEM DATA
1980

Variable
US/USSR

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

8

11

24
40

33

positive
neutral
negative

20
21
12

40
22

positive
neutral
negative

6

21

15

52
27

Total Observatlons

8
1 t:.IL
124

56
38
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SUBSYSTEM DATA
1981
.

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

14
23
37

19

positive
neutral
negative

15
23
14

29
44
27

positive
neutral
negative

4
7
12

17.5
J0.5

Variable
US/USSR

US/W. Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations

142

31
50

52
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TABLE XVII
SUBSYSTEM DATA
1982

US/USSR
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W. Europe/USSR

-

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

17
18
26

28

positive
neutral
negative

16
28
7

.5.5
14

positive
neutral
negative

4
6
15

16
24
60

Variable

Total Observations

lJZ

29.5
42 . .5

31
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TABLE XVIII
SUBSYSTEM DATA
1983
-

Observations

Percent

positive
neutral
negative

16
29
48

17
31
52

positive
neutral
negative

15
20
14

30.5
41
28.5

positive
neutral
negative

10
17
19

22
37
41
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US/USSR

us/w.

Europe

W. Europe/USSR

Total Observations
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